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Abstract 
Public international law requires that states and governments inherit (“succeed to”) the 
debts incurred by their predecessors, however ill-advised those borrowings may have been.  
There are situations in which applying this rule of law strictly can lead to a morally reprehensible 
result.  Example:  forcing future generations of citizens to repay money borrowed in the state’s 
name by, and then stolen by, a former dictator. 
Among the purported exceptions to the general rule of state succession are what have 
been labeled “odious debts”, defined in the early twentieth century as debts incurred by a 
despotic regime that do not benefit the people bound to repay the loans.  The absconding dictator 
is the classic example. 
The removal of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003 sparked a resurgence of interest in this 
subject.  By enshrining a doctrine of odious debts as a recognized exception to the rule of state 
succession, some modern commentators have argued, a successor government would be able 
legally to repudiate the loans incurred by a malodorous prior regime.  This, they contend, would 
have two benefits:  it would avoid the morally repugnant consequence of forcing an innocent 
population to repay debts incurred in their name but not for their benefit, and it would 
simultaneously force prospective lenders to an odious regime to rethink the wisdom of 
advancing funds on so fragile a legal foundation. 
The authors argue that in this recent debate the adjective “odious” has quietly migrated 
away from its traditional place as modifying the word “debts” (as in “odious debts”), so that it 
now modifies the word “regime” (as in “debts of an odious regime”).  This is a major shift.  If 
this new version of the odious debt doctrine is to be workable, someone must assume the task of 
painting a scarlet letter “O” on a great many regimes around the world.  Who will make this 
assessment of odiousness and on what criteria?  The stakes are high.  An unworkable or vague 
doctrine could significantly reduce cross-border capital flows to sovereign borrowers generally. 
The authors are skeptical that this definitional challenge can be met.  Rather than jettison 
the whole initiative as quixotic, however, the authors investigate how far principles of private 
(domestic) law could be used to shield a successor government from the legal enforcement of a 
debt incurred by a prior regime under irregular circumstances.  A wholesale repudiation of all 
contracts signed by an infamous predecessor may be more emotionally and politically satisfying 
for a successor government, but establishing defenses to the legal enforcement of certain of those 
claims based on well-recognized principles of domestic law may be the more prudent path.  The 
authors believe that such defenses exist under U.S. law (and presumably elsewhere) and could be 
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“If we were all responsible for the misdeeds of the 
governments that represent us, thought Isabel, then the moral 
burden would be just too great.”1 
I. The Intergenerational Tension in Sovereign Borrowing 
Imagine a not-unimaginable legal regime in which the debts of deceased 
persons pass automatically to their children or, failing offspring, to the nearest blood 
relative.  Under such a regime, debt collection would not be restricted to the assets of 
the estate of the deceased.  The debts would instead be collectible from the surviving 
blood relatives as personal obligations of those survivors. 
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Born into such a regime, might you not watch with mounting alarm mother’s 
fondness for Capri in September?  Or father’s routine capitulations in the face of 
advertisements for the latest in computer technology?  Or perhaps Uncle Otto’s 
acquaintance with his turf accountant? 
And when your turn came to receive unsolicited credit card applications, 
would you be able to resist that devastating Gucci handbag, secure in the knowledge 
that your niece will only have to work slightly harder during her career to pay for it?  
As the victim of the extravagance of your predecessors, can you be sure that mercy 
alone would instruct your behavior toward your progeny? 
Under such a system, debts, once incurred, would be carried by each 
generation in the bloodline and passed on to each succeeding generation like a bucket 
brigade at a house fire.  Naturally, each generation would be sorely tempted to defer 
the repayment of their inherited debts for as long as possible in the hopes that final 
payment could be delayed to a date, any date, falling after they have managed to 
shuffle off this mortal coil.  Whenever and wherever feasible, bucket-carriers might 
also be tempted to top-up the bucket with their own new liabilities before passing it 
on. 
Every once in a while a virtuous bucket-carrier may resolve to repay the debts 
of his ancestors, and to refrain from new borrowing himself, in order to pass on a 
light and empty bucket to the next generation.  But human nature tells us that such 
examples of virtue will be rare.  Whenever the act of borrowing money is physically 
detached from the disagreeable task of receiving and paying the bill, virtue and 
temptation struggle on unequal ground.  Ask any parent who has ever given a credit 
card to a teenage child as a birthday present. 
The inheritance laws in the United States do not operate in this way.  The 
debts of a natural person are personal in the sense that they may be collected from the 
individual while alive and from the estate of that individual upon death.  They do not, 
however, trickle down some path of consanguinity to be visited upon innocent 
relatives.2  Stated differently, if someone dies owing more money than can be 
collected from the assets of their estate, the creditors attending the funeral will weep 
for reasons that go beyond simple bereavement.  As the Bard would have it:  “He that 
dies pays all debts.”3 
This may not be the system we have adopted for the transmission of personal 
debts, but it is precisely the system that public international law imposes with respect 
                                            
2  See 23 Am. Jur. 2d  §§ 1-20. (2006) .  
3  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 2, ln. 137. 
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to sovereign debts.  Under the public international law doctrine of “state 
succession”4, a government automatically inherits the debts of its predecessor 
governments, regardless of how dissimilar the forms of government may be.5  The 
state, together with its rights and obligations, continues; its governments come and 
go. 
“State succession” is something of a misnomer.  A line is often drawn, 
sometimes drawn very sharply, between governmental succession (where the state 
itself remains intact) and state succession (where the state undergoes some territorial 
change).6  Public international law is particularly strict in requiring successor 
governments to shoulder the debt obligations of their predecessors.  So in the United 
States, it does not matter whether the Democrats or the Republicans win a 
presidential election:  the massive U.S. national debt comes strapped to the keys to 
the White House.  Mrs. Corazon Aquino (a democratically elected leader of the 
Philippines in the late 1980s) may displace a dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, but that 
does not give her the ability under international law to disavow the debts incurred 
under the Marcos regime. 
The doctrine also applies, although in a more checkered way, to situations in 
which the state itself undergoes a major change.7  This occurs both in cases of 
                                            
4  The leading treatises are Ernst Feilchenfeld, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE 
SUCCESSION (1931) (hereinafter “Feilchenfeld”), and Daniel Patrick 
O’Connell, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, 369-453 (1967).  More recently, see Tai Heng 
Cheng, STATE SUCCESSION AND COMMERCIAL OBLIGATIONS (2006). 
5  Aristotle asked, but famously did not answer, this question in Book III of his 
Politics:  “. . . whether it is right or wrong for a state to repudiate public 
obligations when it changes its constitution into another form.”  ARISTOTLE, THE 
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, (E. Barker ed. 1969), bk III, chapt. III, § 7.  See 
generally 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 208, rept. note. 2; BARRY CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, & 
CURTIS BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 449–55, 459–58 (4th ed. 2003) 
(discussing the international rights and obligations that transfer from preceding 
governments upon recognition of a new government). 
6  See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 208, rept. note 2 (“International law sharply distinguishes the 
succession of states, which may create a discontinuity in statehood, from a 
succession of governments, which leaves statehood unaffected”). 
7  See id. at § 209. 
    
4  
 
cession of territory, as well as in cases of secession or the disintegration of a state.8  
When the Republic of Texas joined the United States in 1845, for example, the 
United States inherited (and had to settle) the debts of Texas.9  When the USSR 
disintegrated in 1991, the international community pressured the dominant successor 
state, Russia, to assume all of the debts of the former Soviet Union. 10  A squabble 
over the appropriate division of the assets and liabilities of the former Yugoslavia 
among its various provinces is only now being resolved.11 
In the sovereign context, therefore, debts are congenital (in that each 
generation of citizens inherits a responsibility to contribute toward repayment of the 
old debts merely by being born in the state) and astonishingly adhesive.  The 
obligations will remain legally glued to the territory notwithstanding changes of 
government (constitutional or extra-constitutional), a churning population or even the 
disintegration of the state itself.12 
Contrast this to corporate debts.  Acme Corporation borrows money.  Over 
the years, the management and the board of directors of Acme may change many 
times.  Over a long enough period of time, the entire corpus of Acme shareholders 
will change.  But the debt remains.13  In that sense, corporate debts are also adhesive. 
There are two important differences, however, between corporate debts and 
sovereign debts.  If Acme Corporation becomes indebted beyond its capacity to 
repay, it may seek to have its obligations legally reduced or expunged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Moreover, the corporate planners of Acme are relying on the 
venerable corporate law principle of limited liability to block creditors’ efforts to 
collect their claims, absent unusual circumstances, from Acme’s shareholders. 14  So, 
in the final extremity, the debts of an individual and the debts of a corporation are 
                                            
8  See generally, FEILCHENFELD, supra note 4, at 69-75. 
9  Id. at 271-286. 
10  See Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: the 
Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. J. INT’L L. 355, 369-370 (2001). 
11  See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, The Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 382 (2002); 
Milena Sterio, Implications of the Altmann Decision on Former Yugoslav States, 
20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 39, 39, 47 (2004).  
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 209(2) (1987). 
13 WILLIAM A. KLEIN AND JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108 (9th ed. 2004). 
14 Id. at 145. 
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treated similarly: the debts do not pass involuntarily to those surviving the demise of 
the individual or the company. 
Not so sovereign debts.  Sovereigns cannot look to death, dissolution or 
bankruptcy for liberation from the consequences of imprudent borrowing.  Sovereign 
debts  devolve involuntarily on subsequent generations of citizens, long after the 
people who borrowed the money have departed and, in many cases, long after anyone 
can even remember why the debts were incurred in the first place.  When a sovereign 
sins in this context, it therefore does so without hope of absolution or redemption, 
apart from whatever debt relief the sovereign may be able to negotiate or impose on 
its creditors down the road.15 
Under a strict application of the doctrine of state succession, sovereign debt is 
thus congenital, adhesive and ineradicable.16  It is the combination of these three 
attributes that sets the stage for intergenerational conflict.  The incumbent 
government of a country may incur debts that successor governments will be obliged 
to pay off.  By the very nature of things, those successor governments and the 
citizens they represent are not consulted when the money is borrowed.  They lie 
somewhere in offing -- mute, disenfranchised and wholly reliant on the forbearance 
of their ancestors.  They are, in fact, perfect victims of the linear progression of time. 
When these new citizens finally do appear on the scene, they will inherit 
many things:  a territory, a history and the infrastructure of a society.  They may also 
inherit a stock of unpaid debts; debts that public international law requires them to 
assume as their own obligations.17  The obvious question is whether there are any 
circumstances in which such a bequest can legally be declined, with the consequence 
that the old debts will not bind successor generations of citizens.  Stated differently, 
are there any exceptions to the strict rule of state succession? 
                                            
15   If a state borrows in its own currency, of course, it has one other possible avenue 
of escape -- inflation.  But inflating one’s way out of a sovereign debt problem 
(as tempting as it sometimes seems), is just another way of taxing the citizens 
and stakeholders in the country to pay for the debt. 
16  See, e.g., GEOFFREY WATSON, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, in 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115–27 (Ellen 
Schaffer and Randall J. Snyder eds. 1997). 
17  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 209 (1987). 
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II. A Taxonomy of Sovereign Debt 
Of all the people who have pondered the intergenerational conflict inherent in 
sovereign borrowing, only one has ever offered a truly crisp solution, Thomas 
Jefferson.  On September 6, 1789, Jefferson wrote a letter to his friend James 
Madison in which he declared: 
“[T]he earth belongs in usufruct to the living; . . . the dead have neither 
powers nor rights over it.”18 
Jefferson was then ending his stint as the American Minister in France and 
was poised to return home soon to become the nation’s first Secretary of State.  He 
had been in France long enough to see the early ravages of the French Revolution.  
This sentence was written with particular reference to what Jefferson had come to see 
as the pernicious practice of sovereigns incurring debts that had to be repaid by 
succeeding generations.  He called this principle -- that the earth belongs in usufruct 
to the living -- a principle of natural law.  He described it as “self-evidently” correct 
(a phrase with which he had some success earlier in his career).19 
The solution he proposed was splendidly Jeffersonian.  After studying life 
expectancy tales, Jefferson had determined that if a person of his time reached the 
age of 21, that person was likely to live another 34 years.  Jefferson’s conclusion was 
that each generation may contract debts or, for that matter, may pass laws or enact 
constitutions, that must automatically expire within that generation’s 34-year average 
tenure.  Thus, when a generation comes into its majority, it may legitimately contract 
a debt in the first year having a duration of no more than 34 years, and in the second 
year, 33 years, and so forth.  In this way, one generation can never burden a 
successive generation with its own debts, its own laws or its own constitutions.20 
This was, of course, one of Mr. Jefferson’s more wobbly ideas.  Generations 
are not born on the same day nor do they depart the world at precisely the same 
moment in the future.  A Jeffersonian “shelf life” approach to public debt obligations 
therefore becomes, in practice, impossible to administer. 
If we abandon the hope for a solution that absolves each succeeding 
generation of liability for all previously-contracted debts, the task becomes one of 
                                            
18   Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (September 6, 1789) (available 
at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl81.htm) 
19  Id. 
20  See generally, HERBERT SLOAN, PRINCIPLE & INTEREST 50-53 (1995). 
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deciding which types of inherited debts, if any, are candidates for repudiation by the 
involuntary heirs. 
A. Virtuous Debts 
The classical writers on public international law offered a principled 
justification for the rule that debts pass involuntarily to successor governments and 
states.  It is fair to impose the burden of a debt on future generations, the theorists 
said, because those who follow will enjoy -- often in a very direct way -- the benefit 
of the credit that had been extended to their predecessors.21  An easy case:  a 
municipality borrows money (secured by a pledge of future tax revenues) to build a 
bridge.  Future taxpayers will indeed inherit the burden of paying the debt, but they 
will also have the benefit of driving or walking over the bridge. 
Similarly, the Republic of Ruritania, a fictional country we use in this article 
to develop the argument in a more tangible context, may borrow money to defend 
itself against aggression.22  Future citizens of Ruritania, as evidenced by the fact that 
they can still claim the honor of being called Ruritanians, are the remote beneficiaries 
of the debt.  Or a government may attempt to jump-start a national economy out of a 
depression, as Franklin Roosevelt did in the United States in the 1930s, through 
deficit financing of public works projects.23 
For purposes of this article, we shall call debts incurred for purposes such as 
financing durable infrastructure improvements and the waging of defensive wars, 
“Virtuous Debts”.  Opinions may differ about whether a particular use of proceeds is 
indeed virtuous, but it is enough for present purposes to conclude that certain types of 
sovereign borrowing will benefit the people expected to repay the debt, even if that 
benefit is temporally remote. 
                                            
21  SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, bk VII, ch.10, ¶ 8, in 2 
THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1345–6 (James Brown Scott ed., 1964).  
See also HUGO GROTIUS, OF THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 221-22, 229-30 (J. 
Morice trans., 1715); ARTHUR KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION 2-3 
(1907). 
22  Access to loans “in time of public danger, especially from foreign war”, said 
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, are an “indispensable resource”, 
even to the wealthiest of nations.  Alexander Hamilton, First Report on the 
Public Credit, Jan. 14, 1790, in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 227–28 
(N.C. Lodge, ed., 1904). 
23  See John Steele Gordon, HAMILTON’S BLESSING 122-24 (1997). 
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B. Profligate Debts 
Regrettably, sovereigns do not always borrow for virtuous purposes.  
Representative governments, as well as monarchs, potentates and dictators of all 
stripes are equally free to pledge the full faith and credit of their countries for non-
virtuous purposes.  No modern reader needs a catalog of such purposes, she need 
only develop the habit of reading a daily newspaper.  Non-virtuous purposes include 
the waging of aggressive war or the suppression of one’s own citizens, corruption on 
the part of the ruling regime, breathtakingly ill-advised infrastructure projects, 
expensive (and otiose) toys for the military and so forth. 
In the more debatable column may fall debts that are incurred to finance 
current budget deficits.  A supply-side economist may portray such debts as benign:  
they avoid the need for tax increases that stifle economic growth.  The more robust 
economy produced by the government’s willingness to finance itself through debt 
rather than taxes, the argument goes, will not only produce tax revenues in the future 
sufficient (eventually) to pay off the debts, but that healthy economy is itself a gift to 
future generations -- not unlike a bridge or tunnel.24 
The other side of this debate portrays most financing of current budget 
deficits as being driven by simple political expediency. 25  The argument runs along 
                                            
24  For a recent example of this argument, see Joshua Bolten, Budget for the Future, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2006) at A19. 
25  David Hume, among many others before and since, warned of the danger in these 
terms: 
It is very tempting to a minister to employ such an 
expedient, as enables him to make a great figure during his 
administration, without overburdening the people with 
taxes, or exciting any immediate clamors against himself.  
The practice, therefore, of contracting debt, will almost 
infallibly be abused by every government.  It would 
scarcely be more imprudent to give a prodigal son a credit 
in every banker’s shop in London, than to empower a 
statesman to draw bills, in this manner, upon posterity. 
DAVID HUME, Of Public Credit, in ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, 
AND LITERARY, pt. II, essay IX, ¶ 5(Eugene F. Miller, ed., Liberty 
Fund, 1987) (available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL32.html).  
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these lines:  Elected politicians like to spend money but they don’t like to tax the 
electorate to the point of losing votes.  The solution?  Borrow the money.  You can 
spend it now without taxing the current electorate.  Naturally, some poor 
taxpayer/voter will someday have to pay it back, but when that happens you will be 
quietly contemplating your dignity (and your pension) as an ex-congressman.26 
It is not our intention here to express a view on the relative merits or demerits 
of deficit financing.  It is enough to agree that certain types of sovereign debts -- to 
which we will give the term “Profligate Debts” -- convey little or no benefit to the 
people expected to repay those debts. 
It is this category of Profligate Debts that provokes intergenerational tension.  
Why should a later generation of citizens tax themselves to repay money stolen by a 
former dictator?  Why should they sacrifice their own standard of living, prematurely 
cut off the education of their own children, or delay their own retirements merely 
because their grandparents lacked the discipline to live within their means?  To return 
to the scenario we painted in the opening part of this article for the inheritance of 
family debts, conjure up an image of yourself ten years from now working overtime 
to pay off the flutter that Uncle Otto unwisely placed on a sure thing running in the 
third race yesterday at Pimlico. 
Under the genus of what we are calling Profligate Debts (that is, debts 
incurred for purposes that do not, even indirectly or remotely, benefit the people 
obliged to repay them), public international law theorists have identified two species 
that may qualify as exceptions to the general rule about state succession:  war debts 
and hostile debts.  A third species, dubbed “odious debts”, has become the subject of 
an intense debt. 
1. War Debts 
War debts are those incurred by a government to finance the conduct of 
hostilities against a force, foreign or domestic, that eventually succeeds in 
overthrowing the contracting government.  Bluntly stated, if the rebels get inside the 
presidential palace, they are not obliged to honor loans incurred by the prior 
occupants to purchase the bullets employed in the effort to dissuade the rebels from 
their recent enterprise. 
                                            
26  See GORDON, supra note 23, at 175, 195-96. 
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This doctrine27 is usually traced back to the behavior of Great Britain in 1900 
following the Boer War in South Africa.  The victorious British announced that they 
would voluntarily assume the debts of the South African Republics contracted prior 
to the commencement of hostilities, but none incurred following the commencement 
of the hostilities that we know as the Boer War.28  The British Government did not at 
the time articulate the rationale for this policy.  Perhaps it believed the justification to 
be obvious.29  Paying the debts of a former adversary is one thing, particularly when 
victory brings sovereignty over the disputed territory and resources.  But paying off 
the very loans that both delayed and added to the cost of that victory is quite another 
thing.30 
                                            
27  This area of the law is far murkier than the following description suggests.  
Public international law is derived both from what sovereign states say and from 
what states do.  But what a state says at any particular time may not comport with 
what it says at another time.  What it says may not correspond to how it acts, then 
or thereafter.  And how it acts on one occasion may not constrain its later 
behavior when its interests have changed.  Multiply this pandemonium by the 
190 or so sovereign states on the planet and the aspirational element in the phrase 
“doctrine of public international law” becomes apparent.  
28  See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 4, at 393-95.  It later became apparent that the 
British Government did not believe this policy of recognizing the pre-
belligerency debts of a vanquished enemy was a requirement of international 
law.  See West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King, Law Reports, 
1905, 2 K.B. 391, 394 (submission of S.R. Finlay and Sir E. Carson for the 
Crown). 
29  Feilchenfeld concludes that the British position was based entirely on what 
Britain regarded as a “natural demand of justice”.  Id. at 394. 
30  The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (enacted in 
1868 after the Union victory in the American Civil War) reflects a similar 
approach to the debts incurred by the rebellious Confederate States of America. 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment begins by reaffirming the validity of the 
public debt of the United States.  It then goes on to decree that: 
“. . . neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States . . . but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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Moreover, anyone lending to a belligerent power after hostilities have begun 
is placing an obvious bet -- an “all or nothing” bet -- on the outcome of the war.31  
This aspect of the war debt limitation to the doctrine of state succession is significant 
because it introduces into the debate the reasonable expectations of the creditor when 
extending the loan. 
State succession to debt obligations traditionally concerned itself with the 
allocation of debts in cases of territorial cession, annexation, secession, 
dismemberment and so forth.32  The validity and enforceability of the debts 
themselves, however, were rarely an issue; it was mostly just a matter of pinning the 
debts to one part or the other of a map.  The unspoken premise was that lenders had a 
justifiable expectation under international law to be repaid, even if they could not 
always be sure who would ultimately be held responsible for making the payment. 
A war debts exception to the doctrine of state succession does not question 
the existence of debts; it instead asks whether certain types of debts are enforceable, 
morally and diplomatically, against a conquering state.  And in determining 
enforceability, at least in the context of war debts, the reasonable expectation of the 
creditor when it advanced the money becomes a relevant factor. 
2. Hostile Debts 
At about the same time as the Boer War, an even broader qualification to the 
strict doctrine of state succession was articulated by the United States of America 
following the Spanish American War of 1898.  When that war ended, the belligerent 
powers met in Paris to hammer out a peace treaty.  Under the terms of that treaty, 
Spain ceded to the United States its sovereignty over Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto 
Rico and certain other territories.  As Spain saw things, along with sovereignty came 
the responsibility for repaying the debts of the territory being transferred. 33 
                                            
31 “A creditor who advances money to a belligerent during a war to some extent 
adventures his money on the faith of the borrower’s success.”  John Fisher 
Williams, International Law and International Financial Obligations Arising 
from Contract, BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA DISSERTATIONVM IVS 
INTERNATIONALE ILLVSTRANTIVM, Vol II, at 55 (1924) (hereinafter 
“Williams”).  
32  See WATSON, supra note 13. 
33  JAMES BASSETT MOORE, 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUED BY 
PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
OPINIONS AND DECISIONS OF COURTS FEDERAL AND STATE 352-385 (1906). 
    
12  
 
A particular point of controversy centered on certain loans that the Crown of 
Spain had incurred in its own name but for which Cuban revenue streams had been 
pledged.34  Spain wanted the United States to assume responsibility for these debts in 
its capacity as the new sovereign power in Cuba; the United States was disinclined to 
do so.35 
Each side advanced arguments for its position, citing both juristic opinion and 
state practice.  Spain based its case on the traditional rules of state succession.  If a 
debt exists at the time of a transfer of territory, responsibility for that debt must be 
allocated between the transferor and the transferee, with a strong presumption in 
favor of the transferee (in this case, the United States).  The Spanish delegation went 
so far as to assert that its position was in accordance with rules “observed by all 
cultured nations that are unwilling to trample upon the eternal principles of justice.”36 
For their part, the Americans -- uncultured tramplers that they were -- put 
forward three justifications for the United States’ reluctance to honor these loans.  
First, the Americans argued that the loans had not been contracted for the benefit of 
Cuba; indeed, a portion of the proceeds of the loans had been spent in Spain’s 
campaign to suppress rebellions in the island. 37  Second, Cuba (meaning, 
presumably, the Cuban people) had not consented to these debts.  The loans had been 
imposed on those people by Spain. 38  Finally, the creditors knew that the pledges of 
Cuban revenues to secure the loans had been given in the context of efforts to 
suppress a people struggling for freedom from Spanish rule.  The creditors therefore 
“took the obvious chances of their investment on so precarious a security.”39 
The first of the American arguments was not an appeal to the war debts 
exception.  The Americans were not claming that the proceeds of the disputed loans 
had financed Spain’s war with the United States.  The argument rather looked to 
whether the proceeds of the loans had been used for purposes affirmatively harmful 
to the citizens of Cuba -- the suppression of their independence movement.  In this 
sense, the loans were “hostile” to the very people expected to repay them. 
                                            
34  See FEILCHENFELD, supra note 4, at 329-343. 
35  MOORE, supra note 33, at 352-385. 
 36  Id. at 353; See also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 4, at 335. 
37  MOORE, supra note 33, at 358-359. 
38  Id. 
39  FEILCHENFELD, supra note 4, at 341. 
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The American’s second argument (the absence of the consent of the 
population to the incurrence of the debts) added something new.  It may never have 
occurred to the seventeenth century jurists who framed the doctrine of state 
succession to ask whether the population of the debtor country had consented to a 
borrowing by their ruler or government.  The late-nineteenth century Spanish 
diplomats in Paris certainly did not think this is a relevant factor.  But to an American 
delegation that instinctively viewed the consent of the governed as the touchstone of 
political legitimacy, a debt incurred without that consent was immediately suspect. 
The third argument advanced by the Americans in Paris -- creditors holding 
the disputed loans knew or should have known that the debts would not be 
recoverable if Spanish sovereignty over the island were to end -- was similar to one 
of the predicates of the war debt exception.  Under certain circumstances, sovereign 
lending does not reflect a judgment on the part of the investor about whether the 
country can or will repay the debt; it rather reflects a wager by the lender about 
whether the incumbent regime will remain in power long enough to repay the debt.  
Back the wrong horse, to use the racing metaphor, and the money is uncollectible.  
Only a disingenuous lender pretends otherwise.  The important shift of emphasis here 
involves characterizing the debt as personal to a ruling regime, as opposed to 
assuming that any governing power -- by virtue only of the fact that it is governing -- 
is legally free to contract debts that bind the state.40 
3. Odious Debts 
By the early twentieth century, therefore, the doctrinal cauldron was fairly 
bubbling.  The concept of hostile debts had embraced two propositions.  First, not all 
borrowings by a government will bind the state as a whole; under certain 
circumstances, a loan to a government will be treated as a personal debt of the rulers 
that contracted the loan.  The loan may indeed by repaid out of state funds, but only 
if those politicians retain power over the public fisc long enough to cause this to 
happen.  If the rulers depart, the liability to repay the debt follows them.  Second, if a 
lender knowingly advances funds in these circumstances, it cannot later claim 
surprise and injury if the regime changes and the new government refuses to treat the 
loan as a continuing charge against public revenues. 
Both of these ideas received an important boost as a result of a 1923 
arbitration involving Great Britain and Costa Rica.  William Howard Taft (a former 
                                            
40  In the end, neither Cuba nor the United States assumed these debts in the Treaty 
of Paris, although Spain never formally abandoned its position on the matter.  Id. 
at 343. 
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Yale law professor, colonial administrator of the Philippines, President of the United 
States and then Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court) served as the sole 
arbitrator.41  The facts were these:  In January 1917, the Government of Costa Rica 
was overthrown by Frederico Tinoco and his brother.  His government lasted two 
years.42  Before he left the country, however, Tinoco managed to borrow some 
money from the Royal Bank of Canada.  That money also left the country . . . in the 
company of Messrs. Tinoco.43 
In a subsequent arbitration of Great Britain’s claim that the successor 
government of Costa Rica was bound to honor the loans extended by the Royal Bank 
of Canada.  Costa Rica argued that the Tinoco Government was neither the de facto 
nor the de jure government of Costa Rica and thus could not, under international law, 
bind successor Costa Rican governments.44  Mr. Taft disagreed.  Citing various 
commentators, Taft held that under general principles of international law, a change 
of government has no effect upon the international obligations of the state.45 
That said, however, Taft refused to order Costa Rica to repay the Tinoco 
loans.  These were, Taft said, not transactions of “an ordinary nature” but were “full 
of irregularities”.46  Mr. Taft ruled that the bank “must make out its case of actual 
furnishing of money to the government for its legitimate use.  It has not done so.  The 
bank knew that this money was to be used by the retiring president, F. Tinoco, for his 
                                            
41  Great Britain and Costa Rica jointly chose Taft for this assignment.  See Choose 
Taft as Arbitrator, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1922.  From Great Britain’s perspective, 
however, Taft was an unhappy choice as sole arbitrator.  Taft’s experience as the 
colonial administrator of the Philippines left him with an acute distaste for 
political corruption in what we would today call third world countries.  See 
STANLEY KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA’S EMPIRE IN THE PHILIPPINES 231 
(1989) (“…Taft deplored the pervasive ‘tyranny’ of Filipino officials who never 
understood that ‘office is not solely for private emolument’.”). 
42  Arbitration Between Great Britain and Costa Rica (1923) 1 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. 
AWARDS 369, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 147, 148 (1924) (hereinafter 
“Tinoco Arbitration”). 
43  Id. at 149.  See also Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Iraq and 
Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 411 (2005). 
44  Tinoco Arbitration, reprinted supra note 42, at 149.  
45  Id. at 150–152. 
46  Id. at 168. 
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personal support after he had taken refuge in a foreign country.  It could not hold his 
own government for the money paid to him for this purpose.”47 
Costa Rica’s ability to disown responsibility for the Royal Bank of Canada 
loans therefore had nothing to do with the questionable legal status or legitimacy of 
the Tinoco Government.  Taft expressly rejected this line of argument as being 
inconsistent with the doctrine of state succession.48  Costa Rica could avoid 
responsibility for repaying the debts, Taft held, because the Royal Bank of Canada 
knew that the proceeds of its loans would benefit only Tinoco himself, not the state 
or the people of Costa Rica.49 
  The lessons of Cuba, the Boer War settlement and the Tinoco Arbitration 
were not lost on the international lawyers of this era.  Lenders were repeatedly 
warned about extending loans that might, following a regime change in the debtor 
country, be portrayed as hostile to the citizens of that country, personal to a departing 
dictator, or otherwise lacking the consent of the people ultimately bound to repay the 
loans.50 
In 1927, a Russian jurist, Alexander Sack, stirred this cauldron once again 
and defined a class of what he called “odious” debts.51  In Sack’s formulation, a 
sovereign debt is presumptively odious if: 
 
                                            
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 169. 
49  Id. 
50 “[The lender] must, at the present day, anticipate dangers in imposing on  
communities having no voice in negotiation fiscal burdens lacking local approval,  
unless the benefits of the loan through the expenditure of proceeds are confined to  
the territory burdened with service.”  Charles C. Hyde, The Negotiation of External  
Loans With Foreign Governments, 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 523, 531 (1922).  See also  
Williams, supra note 31at 55 (“A creditor who claims for money lent to satisfy the  
personal whims of a despot or dictator has not so good a claim for money as one who  
advanced his money for  the economic development of the country on the faith of the  
legislative act of a representative assembly.”) 
 
51  ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS 
DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES [THE EFFECTS OF 
STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS] 157–84 (1927). 
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• the debt is contracted by a “despotic” power,52 
• for a purpose that is not in the general interests or needs of the 
state, and 
• the lender knows that the proceeds of the debt will not benefit the 
nation as a whole.53 
Under Sack’s theory, the consequence of tarring a debt with the label 
“odious” is that the debt is deemed to be personal to the despotic regime that 
contracted it and can only be collected from that regime.54  It follows that successor 
governments of the country can legally repudiate the debt once the despot is 
removed. 
The odious debt exception to the general rule of state succession, at least as 
Alexander Sack defined it, comprised a very narrow corner of what we have called 
Profligate Debts.  The three attributes of Sack’s odious debt definition are linked with 
connectives:  the debt must be incurred by a despot (that is, without the consent of 
the population) and it must not benefit the state as a whole and the lender must be 
aware of these facts.  Like a Las Vegas slot machine, all three cherries must 
simultaneously come into alignment before the Sackian odious debt bell starts to 
ring. 
Under this definition, therefore, a Virtuous Debt (one that benefits, however 
remotely, the people obliged to repay the debt), even if incurred by a tyrannical 
regime, cannot be branded odious.  A Profligate Debt, no matter how hare-brained 
the intended use of proceeds, is not odious if it is contracted by a representative 
government.  Finally, a Profligate Debt borrowed by a detestable regime is not 
odious if the lender genuinely believes that the proceeds will be used for a purpose 
that benefits the country. 
Indeed, the contours of odious debt category begin to blur almost as soon as 
one moves beyond debts incurred to suppress the people expected to repay them (the 
Cuban example) and loans to a dictator, for the dictator and stolen by the dictator (the 
Tinoco case).  This is not to say that there is any shortage of debts falling under those 
two descriptions; sadly, there are too many candidates.  But pushing the concept of 
                                            
52  Id. at 157.  The implication here seems to be that the people of a country do not 
consent to the incurrence of debts by a despot. 
53  Id. 
54  Id.  
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odious debt into more gauzy factual situations reveals its limits as a legal diagnostic 
tool. 
For example, the Tinoco case was remarkable only to the extent that Tinoco 
appears to have appropriated for his own use the entire proceeds of the Royal Bank 
of Canada loans.55  Modern dictators do not behave in this way, and even the most 
indulgent lender might nowadays balk at a credit proposal whose “use of proceeds” 
line reads “corruption -- high, wide and handsome”.  The modern technique is to steal 
only part of a loan, not the whole of it.  So, the construction of a new hospital for 
children with terminal diseases requires financing of $50 million.  The dictator du 
jour demands (indirectly, of course) a modest 5% commission; perhaps a level just 
below what an open-eyed lender would be forced to confront in its due diligence 
investigation.  Is the loan odious?  Partially odious (a new concept)?  Does the 
overwhelmingly virtuous purpose of the loan justify, in a moral sense, a small 
blemish of transactional corruption?  How would the terminally-ill children vote on 
that question? 
Most of the elements of the odious debt idea were already in play before 
Alexander Sack added his contribution in 1927. 56  Among these was the notion that 
if a country (meaning the population of the country over time) must assume the 
burden of repaying a debt, it should have realized some benefit from the loan when 
the debt was incurred.  Debts imposed on a country without the consent of the 
citizens are suspect.  A creditor that advances money to a ruling regime knowing that 
the proceeds will not benefit the nation or its people can expect repayment only from 
the individuals contracting the debt. 
Did the odious debt formulation therefore add anything new to this debate, or 
was it intended merely as a summary and restatement of the discussion as it stood in 
the late 1920s?  We believe that the odious debt doctrine was just a summary and 
restatement.  From the War Debt and Hostile Debt exceptions, Sack drew the idea of 
loans that were used only to “strengthen” the governing regime, ”suppress a popular 
insurrection” or were otherwise “hostile” to the interest of the people of the 
                                            
55  See Tinoco Arbitration, reprinted supra note 42, at 169 (“[The credit transfers in 
question were] so closely connected with this payment for obviously personal 
and unlawful uses of the Tinoco brothers that in the absence of any explanation 
on behalf of the Royal Bank, it cannot be made the basis of a claim that it was for 
any legitimate governmental use of the Tinoco government.”). 
56  See id. at 150 (discussing state succession principles under international law); see 
also FEILCHENFELD supra note 4, at 329-343 (discussing the principles 
established in the Cuban case). 
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country.57 .From Taft’s decision in the Tinoco Arbitration, Sack gleaned the 
requirement that the lender know about the illegitimate purpose of the borrowing 
before the loan could be branded objectionable, as well as the notion that such a debt 
was ”personal” to the ruler who commissioned it. 
Alexander Sack did, however, contribute two highly emotive adjectives to the 
debate:  “despotic” and “odious”.  Had he been less colorful in his choice of 
adjectives, we believe that this topic would have attracted less public attention than it 
has in this century. 
C. The Rebirth of the Odious Debt Debate 
The concept of odious debts languished in something of a doctrinal backwater 
for many years.  The phrase was occasionally enlisted for its emotive force to 
describe the pillaging of state treasuries by dictators such as Marcos in the 
Philippines, the Duvaliers (père and fils) in Haiti, Mobutu in the Congo or the 
Abachas in Nigeria.58  Only rarely was the legal significance of the doctrine tested in 
municipal courts of law as a defense to the repayment  
                                            
57 Sack, supra note 51at 157. 
58  See, e.g., Joseph Hanlon, Dictators and Debt (Jubilee Reports, Nov. 1998) 
(http://www.jubileeresearch.org/analysis/reports/dictatorsreport.htm).  See also 
PATRICIA ADAMS, LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD WORLD’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991); Juliette Majot, The Doctrine of Odious Debts, 
in FIFTY YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 35 (1994); James L. Foorman & Michael E. 
Jehle, Effects of State and Government Succession on Commercial Bank Loans to 
Foreign Sovereign Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982); Günter 
Frankenberg & Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of 
Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 
12 INT’L. J. OF SOCIOLOGY OF L. 415 (1984); M. H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass 
Darkly: Reflections upon the History of International Law of Public Debt in 
Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 39 (1982); Theodor 
Meron, The Repudiation of Ultra Vires State Contracts and the International 
Responsibility of States, 6 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 273 (1957); Alexander N. Sack, 
Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets, New York University, Contemporary 
Law Pamphlets, Series 1, Number 7, NYU L. Q. REV. (1938). 
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of a sovereign debt, 59 or in an international arbitration.60 
This changed abruptly, however, following the American invasion of Iraq in 
2003 to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein.  During the roughly 25 years that 
Saddam controlled Iraq, his regime managed to rack up approximately $125 billion 
of unpaid debts.61  Following the American invasion, a number of commentators 
argued that most of these liabilities, in light of their provenance and their purpose (in 
large part to finance domestic tyranny and military aggression), should be declared 
odious and written off.62  This in turn kindled a significant resurgence in the literature 
                                            
59  Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982); 
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th C. 1986).  See 
James E. Feinerman, Odious Debts: Old and New (unpublished draft on file with 
authors) (forthcoming, DUKE JOURNAL OF LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 
2006) (providing an extended discussion of the Chinese Railroad debt and the 
treatment of the odious debt issue in the Jackson case itself).  See also United 
States v. National City Bank of New York, 90 F. Supp. 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) 
and Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927).  
The Lehigh Valley court quotes the following passage from Moore: 
Changes in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule 
affect its position in international law.  A monarchy may be transformed into 
a republic, or a republic into a monarchy; absolute principles may be 
substituted for constitutional, or the reverse; but, though the government 
changes, the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired. 
Lehigh Valley, 21 F.2d at 401 (internal citation omitted). 
60  In the context of an arbitration before the Iran Claims Tribunal, Iran argued that a 
certain contract of the prior regime was odious and could not be transferred to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.  The Tribunal’s decision refused to take a stand on the 
“doctrinal debate” about the concept of odious debt in international law.  The 
Tribunal did volunteer its view, however, that the concept of odious debt was 
limited exclusively to cases of state succession, not governmental succession.  
United States v. Iran, 32 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 162, Award No. 574-B36-2 
(Dec. 3, 1996). 
61  See Ali Allawi, Why Iraq’s Debt Deal Makes Sense, EUROMONEY (Sept. 2005) at 
213. 
62  See, e.g., Pentagon Adviser Perle: Private Sector Key to Iraqi Recovery, 53 THE 
OIL DAILY, No. 12, June 12, 2003 (reporting that Richard Perle, member of the 
Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, called for Iraq’s $100 billion plus of debt to be 
forgiven because it had been accumulated under a “vicious dictatorship”); 
Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts, September 28, 2004 (Cato Institute 
Publication No. 526) (available at: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa526.pdf);  Joe 
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and debate surrounding the topic of odious debt.63  You are holding in your hands a 
specimen of that resurgent literature.64 
                                                                                                                           
Siegle, After Iraq Let’s Forgive Some Other Debts, INTERNATIONAL HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 2004 (reprinted at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/6786/after_iraq_lets_forgive_some_other_debts.h
tml).  But see Iraq's debt: The US should beware the principle of odious lending, 




63  See, e.g., NOREENA HERTZ, IOU: THE DEBT THREAT AND WHY WE MUST DEFUSE 
IT (2004); Joseph Hanlon, “Illegitimate Debt”: When Creditors Should be Liable 
for Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 109 
(Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds. 2006); Chris Jochnick, The Legal Case 
for Debt Repuidiation, in id. at 132.  Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 
EMORY L. J. 923 (2004); Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt 
(unpublished draft dated May 1, 2006, on file with authors); Anna Gelpern, What 
Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005); 
Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 
2003 (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200311/stiglitz ); 
Christoph G. Paulus, Do “Odious Debts” Free Over-indebted States from the 
Debt Trap?, UNIFORM L. REV. (2005) (available at: 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/germany/UniformLawR.pdf); Ashfaq Khalfan, 
Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine  13-21, Center 
for International Sustainable Development Law Working Paper No. 
COM/RES/ESJ (Mar 11, 2003) (available at 
http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf; Michael Kremer & Seema 
Jayachandran, Odious Debt (April 2005 draft available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/webpapers/Odious_Debt05.pdf
) (forthcoming American Economic Review, 2006). 
64  In pursuing a cancellation and restructuring of the Saddam-era debt stock, the 
new Iraqi authorities were not oblivious to the potential relevance of the odious 
debt label.  Iraq’s Minister of Finance, Ali A. Allawi, described the concept in a 
sympathetic way in a September 2005 article.  He wrote: 
Widely different views have been expressed about the 
appropriate treatment of Iraq’s Saddam-era debts.  Some have 
argued that all of this debt, in view of its provenance, should be 
classified as odious and cancelled outright.  Lend to a despot, 
they say, and you should expect repayment only from the despot.  
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Much of this renewed interest in odious debt enlists the terminology, but not 
the actual content, of the conventional doctrine.  An odious debt, à la Alexander 
Sack, called for a loan-by-loan analysis.  Some of the recent commentators are 
prepared to assume that all odious regimes behave odiously all the time and therefore 
all of their debts must be odious.  The emphasis is thus placed on the odious nature of 
the regime, not on the circumstances surrounding each loan.  All loans to a dictatorial 
regime are thus presumptively odious and liable to repudiation if the regime 
collapses. 65 
Under this approach, much of the definitional swamp referred to above can be 
circumvented.  Sack’s formulation called for difficult judgments about whether a 
particular loan “benefits” the country, how the “consent” of the population to the 
incurrence of a debt could ever be established and what standards will be applied in 
assessing the lender’s “knowing” involvement in the transaction.66  These questions 
are largely irrelevant if the only significant criterion for identifying an odious debt is 
that the loan was extended to an opprobrious regime.  From Sack’s original list, 
therefore, only one significant criterion remains -- deciding whether the borrowing 
regime is “despotic” (or at least was despotic at the time the loan was made).67 
                                                                                                                           
If a country manages to free itself from the incubus of an odious 
regime, the citizenry should not be forced to carry the burden of 
that regime’s immoral extravagances for generations to come. 
See Allawi, supra note 61. 
 Notwithstanding these sentiments, the Iraqi Government elected not to base its 
request (successful, as it turned out) for an 80% cancellation of the Saddam-era 
debt stock on odious debt grounds.  Id. 
65  Khalfan, et. al, for example, argue that a Sackian debt-by-debt analysis “assumes 
without justification that absence of consent may not be presumed in instances 
involving dictatorial governments.”  They hold that a “dictatorial government is 
one that by definition rules without the consent of the people.  It follows that in 
purported dictatorial polities consent must be presumed absent, unless proven 
otherwise (by widespread popular approval of the transaction).”  Khalfan, et. al, 
supra note 63, at 42; cf. also Hanlon, supra note 61 (emphasizing the odiousness 
of the regime, rather than creditor consent or benefits to the populace, as the 
primary reason to nullify the debt). 
66   See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.  
67  Khalfan, et. al, supra note 63, at 42.  
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To some modern commentators, therefore, the debate no longer involves 
odious debts, it involves debts of an odious regime.68  This is a major shift.  It is 
curious that some of these commentators do not appear to be aware of how far they 
have left Alexander Sack and Chief Justice Taft behind. 
Indeed, it would astonish Alexander Sack to learn that his catchy adjective 
“odious” had, in the twenty-first century, become the rallying cry of groups 
advocating the wholesale forgiveness of the sovereign debt of countries victimized 
by despotic or kleptomaniacal regimes.  Sack himself would have recoiled at casually 
branding debts as odious .  Sack envisioned the formation of international tribunal 
charged with making the determination of odiousness.  In a proceeding before that 
tribunal, the burden of persuasion would rest with the new government seeking to 
disavow responsibility for the debt.  A new government would be required to 
establish that the proceeds of the borrowing were used for purposes contrary to the 
interests of the population of the country and that the lender, at the time the loan was 
extended, knew this to be the case.”69  Even then, Sack’s tribunal would afford the 
lender an opportunity to rebut the inference of an odious purpose to the loan.70 
Throughout the balance of his long career as a law teacher, Alexander Sack 
advocated a very strict application of the doctrine of government succession to debt 
obligations.  State public debts, he later wrote, are a “charge upon the territory of the 
State,” by which he meant the entire financial resources of the State within its 
territorial limits.71  He openly ridiculed the argument of the Soviet government in the 
USSR in 1918 that it, as the government of the “workers and peasants”, had the legal 
right to repudiate the debts incurred by prior Russian governments of the “landlords 
and bourgeoisie”.72 
III. Do We Need a Doctrine of Odious Debts? 
It is morally repugnant to saddle the population of a country, down unto 
generations yet unborn, with the obligation to repay debts that are truly odious in the 
                                            
68  See generally note 63 and accompanying text.  
69 Sack, supra note ___at 163. 
70 Id. 
71 Alexander Sack, The Judicial Nature of the Public Debt of States, 10 N.Y.U. Law 
Quarterly 341, 357-58 (1932). 
72 See Alexander Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918-1938), N.Y.U. 
Law Quarterly Rev., 1, 10 (1937). 
    
23  
 
Sackian sense.  Most people instinctively believe that the consequences of 
reprehensible acts should be visited exclusively on the malefactors (in this case, the 
corrupt regime and its complaisant creditors).  The question is: can this moral 
imperative be translated into a workable legal theory? 
We might start by questioning the fundamental premise of the rule about 
government succession to debt obligations.  Why should international law start with 
the presumption that all state debts automatically bind successor governments, and 
force the naysayers to wring out begrudging exceptions to this rule?  Why not turn 
the thing on its head and presume that successor governments are bound only by 
those obligations that they expressly agree to assume?  After all, as noted above, this 
is the rule that our society has found appropriate for the transmission of the 
unsatisfied personal debts of a decedent.73 
There are two answers to these questions.  The inheritance of Virtuous Debts 
by successor governments and generations of citizens does not strike most people as 
unreasonable.  The benefit/burden theory articulated by the early publicists has a 
foundation in common sense.  Our property and inheritance laws also reflect it.74  
Uncle Otto’s gambling debts will not automatically pass to Otto’s next of kin, but the 
mortgage on Uncle Otto’s house must be assumed by his heir if that person wants to 
live in the house.  With the benefit comes the burden.75 
On the practical side, no one will lend to a sovereign borrower knowing the 
debt will automatically be extinguished by the next election or even by the next 
revolution.  Nor, by the way, would anyone lend to a corporate borrower if the debt 
could be legally repudiated by a successor board of directors or majority shareholder.  
The presumption of state succession to previously-incurred debts thus provides the 
legal basis for all cross-border lending to sovereign borrowers.  Undermining that 
presumption could significantly affect the ability of sovereign borrowers to raise 
capital.76 
The dilemma therefore boils down to this:  can the strict rule of government 
succession to debt obligations be moderated to prevent it from sanctioning the 
                                            
73  See supra note 2 and accompanying text (referencing the general operation of 
inheritance laws in the United States).  
74   See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944) (discussing the relationships 
between benefits and burdens). 
75  Id. 
76  See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan, Odious or Just Malodorous, FINANCE & 
DEVELOPMENT 54 (December 2004). 
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morally repugnant consequence of an involuntary transmission of objectionable 
debts, without bringing a significant part of cross-border sovereign finance to a 
standstill? 
A. What Is the Objective? 
The muddled nature of the recent debate about odious debts cannot be blamed 
exclusively on the tendency of some modern commentators to allow the adjective 
“odious” to migrate away from modifying the word “debt” into a position where it 
instead modifies the word “regime”.77  Beneath the surface of the debate, there is also 
a fundamental disagreement about the objective of the entire exercise. 
A traditionalist -- a Sackian -- would say that the objective is to identify 
objectionable cross-border financial transactions that should not be enforceable, by 
legal or diplomatic means, if the governmental regime in the debtor country changes.  
Others, however, aim at a more ambitious goal.  They wish to define both the 
standard and the mechanism by which odious regimes can be spotted before the 
money is lent.78  The theory is very similar to a public notice system for the recording 
of security interests:  once the mortgage or security interest has been filed, 
subsequent lenders are on notice that the property is encumbered by a prior lien.79  In 
this case, once a regime has been publicly and authoritatively branded as odious, 
subsequent lenders are on notice that their credits to the regime may be legally 
repudiated by a successor government.80 
For these modern odious debt theorists, therefore the most important thing is 
to be able to spot the despot, the dictator, the tyrant -- in other words, the odious 
regime.81  From there the analysis can proceed easily through a series of 
presumptions.  Odious regimes can be presumed to act only in their own self-interest, 
that’s how they earned the moniker “odious” in the first place.  Creditors who deal 
with such regimes can be presumed to know their self-dealing habits.  Those 
                                            
77  See Gelpern supra note 43, at 393; Khalfan, et. al., supra note 63, at 47; Seema 
Jayachandran, Michael Kremer, & Jonathan Shafter, Applying the Odious Debts 
Doctrine While Preserving Legitimate Lending, (forthcoming, ETHICS & INT’L 
AFFAIRS (2006)); KREMER & JAYACHANDRAN, supra note 63, at 3-4. 
78  E.g., KREMER & JAYACHANDRAN, supra note 63, at 3–4. 
79  See generally, 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 307 (2005). 
80  Id.  
81  Id. 
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creditors are thus knowingly placing an “all or nothing” bet on the continuance of the 
regime when they assess the commercial risk of the loan.  And finally, lenders being 
lenders, one may confidently predict that the pricing of the loan will reflect (upward) 
this all or nothing political gamble on the part of the creditors.  If the risk 
materializes, the theory concludes, the legal judgment and the moral judgment on the 
lenders should be identical -- too bad. 82 
The proponents of this approach see in it a significant advantage, over and 
above the ability of the debtor country to repudiate individual loans contracted by an 
odious predecessor regime.  By putting prospective lenders on notice that they may 
lose their entire investment if the regime changes in the debtor country, this approach 
seeks to shut off the flow of funds to that regime before it begins.  It is the financial 
equivalent of what oncologists call “starving the tumor.” 
At least one principled argument can be marshaled in support of a regime-
centric approach to odious debt.  An odious regime is, by definition, a curse upon the 
people of the country.  Anything done to support such a regime is therefore hostile to 
the interests of those people.  If financing a new hospital for children with terminal 
diseases allows the regime to present itself as compassionate and civilized, and if that 
illusion allows the regime to remain in power even one day longer than would 
otherwise have been the case, then the financing for that project is inimical to the 
general interests of the population.  Naturally, this same argument would support the 
repudiation of any contractual arrangement with an odious regime, not just debt 
contracts. 
Similarly, international humanitarian organizations send emergency relief 
teams into some of the most appalling conditions imaginable and they are 
occasionally pilloried for doing so.83  By alleviating the suffering inflicted by a 
barbarous regime, critics argue, these humanitarians are just deferring the time when 
that regime must face the full unbuffered wrath of its own people and the 
                                            
82  Richard Perle’s call for the elimination of Iraq’s debts on the grounds that this 
would have the effect of teaching banks about the risks of lending to a “vicious 
regime” was in this vein.  See James Harding, Top Adviser Backs Loan 
Forgiveness, FINANCIAL TIMES, 12, June 12, 2003.  See also Jayachandran, 
Kremer, & Shafter, supra note 77 (proposing an ex ante designation for regimes 
that are “Odious Debt prone”). 
83  Michael Wines, When Doing Good Also Aids the Devil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
2005, § 4, at 5. 
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international community.84  Are the humanitarians not, under the guise of helping a 
few people, only prolonging the agony of many others? 
These are deep moral waters.  A regime-centric approach to identifying 
odious debts seeks to shut off the flow of funds to a contemptible regime -- and thus 
hasten its demise -- by threatening to invalidate the loans under public international 
law if the regime changes.  International economic sanctions, of course, have the 
same goal.  But the effect of such sanctions on the people of the target country 
(sanctions on Iraq between the first and second Gulf Wars are a good example) can 
be terrible, and such sanctions are not lacking in critics.85 
B. Is There Now a “Doctrine” of Odious Debts? 
Some commentators would like to elevate the category of odious debts into a 
recognized exception to the rule of state succession86; elevate it in such a way that 
bilateral (governmental) creditors would not be able to exert diplomatic pressure on 
successor governments to honor odious debts, and commercial creditors would not be 
able to enforce odious debts in municipal courts.  Before it can be so elevated, 
however, the characteristics of this odious debt category need to be sharply defined. 
In this lies the challenge.  Alexander Sack’s response was to lay out a series 
of criteria, each of which had to be met before a debt could be declared odious.87  In 
practical terms, however, these criteria marked out only loans to corrupt dictators 
who, with the lenders’ knowledge, used the proceeds for their own private 
enrichment, and loans whose proceeds were employed to suppress rebellious 
                                            
84  See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Help or Hindrance: Can Foreign Aid Prevent 
International Crisis?, 273 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (1997). 
85  See, e.g., David A. Baldwin, Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization 
and Free Trade: Prologamena to Thinking about Economic Sanctions and Free 
Trade, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 271, 276 (Fall 2003) (outlining the criteria for 
determining if economic sanctions are successful); Justin D. Stalls, Economic 
Sanctions, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 146–52 (Fall 2003) 
(highlighting the factors policy makers utilize when judging the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions). See also Carla Fried, How States Are Aiming to Keep 
Dollars Out of Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006 at B5. 
86  The categories of War Debts and Hostile Debts have probably reached this status 
already.  See supra, notes 27 to 40 and accompanying text.  See also J.G. 
STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (5th ed. 1963). 
87  SACK, supra note 45. 
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subjects.  These were, interestingly, the only specific examples Sack himself offered 
of odious debts.88 
There is no need, by contrast, under the contemporary approach to the issue, 
to fret about whether the citizens of the debtor country had “consented” to a 
particular loan, or whether the loan “benefited” the country as opposed to the despot.  
These difficult judgments are swept away in the cascade of presumptions that follow 
from tagging a borrowing regime as odious.  Unfortunately, even that one remaining 
judgment -- is this regime odious? -- can be elusive.  One is tempted, strongly 
tempted, to adopt an approach along the lines of Justice Holmes’ rule-of-thumb for 
distinguishing an unconstitutional statute (“does it make you want to puke?”)89 or 
Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” standard for pornography.90  But it isn’t 
that easy. 
Odiousness -- whether of regimes, individuals or certain cooked green 
vegetables -- is a subjective concept.  But in this context, it dangerously invites 
ethnocentrism.  Is a democracy a necessary condition for avoiding the label odious?  
Is it a sufficient condition?91  Is universal suffrage a necessary predicate?  Equal 
rights for women?  Is a regime odious if it misprizes environmental issues or civil 
rights?  And so forth and endlessly so on. 
Can a regime be odious one day and honorable the next?  Ferdinand Marcos 
was twice elected President of the Republic of the Philippines before he declared 
martial law and became a dictator. One imagines that he yielded to pecuniary 
temptation both before and after declaring martial law.  When, exactly, did he 
become odious? 
                                            
88 Id., at 157. 
89  See Letter from Justice Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), reprinted in 2 
HOLMES LASKI LETTERS 1124, 888 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
90  Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
91  See, e.g., Renwick McLean, U.S. Bars Spain’s Sale of Planes to ‘Undemocratic’ 
Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006 at 6 (discussing a statement released in 
January, 2006 by the U.S. embassy in Caracas that described the administration 
of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, as “[d]espite being democratically 
elected, the government of President Hugo Chavez has systematically 
undermined democratic institutions, pressured and harassed independent media 
and the political opposition, and grown progressively more autocratic and 
antidemocratic.”).  
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Finally, who is to make the judgment?  The lender?  Obviously not.  Were 
this the test, the municipality of Rome would still be paying off Caligula’s gambling 
debts. 
The sovereign debtor?  Unlikely.  Remember that the sovereign debtor in this 
case means the successor regime; the one that has every economic motivation to 
paint its predecessor in an unflattering light.  After a hard-fought political campaign, 
much less a hard-fought insurrection, politicians are already predisposed to view the 
ancien régime as a gang of deeply-dyed villains.  If reaching this conclusion also 
provides an excuse to repudiate the debts incurred by that prior administration, 
economy will inevitably beget calumny. 
This leaves the international community, or some subset or organ of the 
international community.  But is this realistic?  It would thrust the matter into the 
realm of international politics, a place where morality and predictability rarely 
penetrate.  We do not believe that the international community, or any part of it, can 
be relied upon to reach a principled judgment about the odious character of a regime, 
divorced from the immediate geopolitical interests of the states (or their proxies) 
making that judgment.  Saddam Hussein was, after all, the darling of the United 
States and its allies in the early 1980s when he was seen as a bulwark against Iran; he 
became a villain in their eyes only later in his career.  Was Saddam odious (but 
unacknowledged as such) in the 1980s?  Or did he mature into rank odiousness over 
time?  And if the latter, why should the debts he incurred on behalf of Iraq in his 
more benignant youth be branded odious twenty years later? 
Finally, to be useful in a litigation in the United States over an allegedly 
odious loan, the sovereign defendant would have to establish that the odious debt 
doctrine was now part of “international customary law” -- that is, part of the “general 
and consistent practice of states and followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligations.”92  Even the advocates of an odious debt doctrine might hesitate before 
claiming that it is now part of the “general and consistent practice of states.”93 
                                            
92  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102(2).  
93  See Christoph G. Paulus, Odious Debts vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 83, 91 (2005) (noting that the doctrine of odious debts has not 
yet achieved the status of customary international law); Jeff King, Saddam’s Evil 
Debts, FIN. POST (Oct. 23, 2003) (“… the [odious debt] doctrine is contestable 
under international law …”); Paul B. Stephan, The Institutionalist Implications of 
an Odious Debt Doctrine (unpublished draft on file with authors) (forthcoming 
JOURNAL OF LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (2007)) (noting the lack of 
precedent on the matter of odious debt).  Anna Gelpern writes: 
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IV. The Alternative:  Principles of Private Law 
We believe that a principle of public international law concerning odious 
debts does not now have, nor is it likely to achieve, the consensus necessary for it to 
claim the title of “doctrine”, or the degree of clarity necessary for it to be of much use 
in invalidating purportedly odious loans without simultaneously discouraging many 
legitimate cross-border financings.  We instead propose to investigate the extent to 
which the problem can be addressed by relying on well-established principles of 
private (domestic) law. 
We propose to focus on three fact patterns, each involving a loan to the 
Republic of Ruritania.  The loan agreement is expressed to be governed by the law of 
the State of New York and Ruritania submits to the jurisdiction of New York courts 
for purposes of disputes about the loan.94  In each case, the Ruritanian Minister of 
Finance signs the loan on behalf of the Republic, pledging the full faith and credit of 
the Republic for repayment of the debt.  The three situations are: 
(i) At the time the money is borrowed, Ruritania is ruled by a 
corrupt dictatorship.  The lender knows that all or a part of 
                                                                                                                           
As it happens, no national or international tribunal has ever cited Odious Debt as  
grounds for invalidating a sovereign obligation.  Each of the treaties and other  
examples of state practice cited even by the doctrine's most thorough and  
principled advocates appears fundamentally flawed -- it lacks one or more of the  
doctrine's essential elements and/or is accompanied by a chorus of specific  
disavowals of the doctrine by indispensable parties.  But even if the examples  
were on point, the fact that Odious Debt's most fervent proponents to this day  
must cite an 1898 treaty and a 1923 arbitration as their best authorities  
suggests that the law-making project is in trouble.   
 
Gelpern, supra note 43, at 406. 
 
94  Some advocates of an odious debt doctrine recommend actively trying to avoid 
New York courts as the forum for lawsuits involving sovereign debts that could 
qualify as odious.  See Khalfan, et al., supra note 63, at 68-69 (“… New York 
would not be the ideal preliminary site for odious debts litigation.”)  They argue -
- correctly, in our view -- that New York courts would not be receptive to a 
defense based on a purported public international law doctrine of odious debts.  
The defenses discussed in Part IV.A, infra, however, are based upon existing 
principles of New York law and do not require a resort to a separate concept of 
an odious debt. 
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the proceeds of the loan will be stolen by members of the 
ruling regime (the “Corrupt Loan”).  The lender accepts this 
pilfering in order to win the mandate or perhaps because the 
government is prepared to pay a higher interest rate on the 
loan than would have been true in the absence of this special 
feature of the transaction. 
(ii) Ruritania is ruled by a corrupt dictatorship.  The lender 
suspects, but does not know for sure, that some or all of the 
proceeds of the loan will be stolen by members of the ruling 
regime (the “Suspicious Loan”). 
(iii) Ruritania has an elected, representative government.  That 
government uses the proceeds of the loan for the sole 
purpose of funding a program to count -- individually -- each 
grain of sand in the vast Ruritanian desert; the counting to be 
done by a team composed exclusively of Nobel prize-
winning economists.  No personal corruption by government 
officials is involved or suspected (the “Utterly Fatuous 
Loan”).95 
The ruling regime in Ruritania subsequently changes; the new administration 
disavows the loan as being contrary to the interests of all honest Ruritanians; the loan 
goes into default; and the lender brings an action to enforce the loan in a U.S. court.  





                                            
95  In the world of sovereign borrowing, conjuring up a use of proceeds that would 
be recognized by the reader as utterly fatuous requires creativity.  See, e.g., 
Richard N. Ostling, The Basilica in the Bush:  The Biggest Church in 
Christendom Arises in the Ivory Coast, TIME (July 3, 1989) at 38 (reporting on a 
basilica, larger than St. Peter’s in Rome, built in the African bush, 135 miles 
from the nearest urban center with an estimated cost of over $200 million). 
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A. Possible Defenses 
1. Considerations of Public Policy 
Bribery, whether in a commercial,96 domestic political97 or foreign 
governmental context,98 is contrary to the public policy of the United States and its 
constituent states.  In our hypothetical about the Corrupt Loan, the lender knew that 
the Ruritanian officials executing the loan agreement on behalf of the Republic were 
intending to pocket some or all of the proceeds of the loan.  The lender acquiesced in 
this behavior because, in return, the lender received the mandate (and the fees) to 
arrange the loan, or perhaps the government officials committed the Republic to 
paying an above-market rate of interest on the loan.  Whether the Ruritanian officials 
were paid an outright bribe to issue a mandate or to accept an overpriced loan, or 
whether the lender agreed to look the other way as the officials skimmed the 
proceeds of the loan itself, strikes us as irrelevant.  The Ruritanian officials were 
induced to breach their fiduciary duty to Ruritania.  They were bribed. 
Had the lender been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time 
the loan was extended, this conduct may have been criminal -- a possible violation of 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.99  But regardless of the lender’s domicile, a 
                                            
96  Commercial bribery may violate state laws.  See Bankers Trust Company v. 
Litton Systems, 599 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding lease contracts for 
photocopiers unenforceable because they had arisen through an illegal bribe); 
Pharmaceutical Sales and Consulting Corp., v. J.W.S. Delavau Co., Inc., 106 
F.Supp.2d 761 (D.N.J. 2000) (stating that under New Jersey law, a public policy 
defense of commercial bribery can be asserted to avoid enforcement of a 
contract); see also N.Y. Penal Law § 180.00 
97  See, e.g., U.S. v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a local 
sheriff was subject to a federal bribery statute enacted by Congress to further the 
public policy against bribery of government officials); Brown Const. Trades, Inc. 
v. United States., 23 Cl.Ct. 214 (Cl.Ct. 1991) (holding that the conviction of a 
public contractor on charges of bribery of a government official was sufficient to 
render a contract unenforceable). 
98  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(a) (2000); Adler 
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that an 
illegal contract entered into by plaintiff to bribe Nigerian officials barred the 
plaintiff’s ability to recover on a breach of contract claim).  
99 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (2000). 
    
32  
 
subsequent lawsuit by the lender to enforce a contract (the loan) that had been 
procured by the plaintiff’s own misconduct (the bribe) would not prosper in a U.S. 
court.  As the New York Court of Appeals expressed it: 
Consistent with public morality and settled public policy, we 
hold that a party will be denied recovery even on a contract 
valid on its face, if it appears that he has resorted to gravely 
immoral and illegal conduct in accomplishing its 
performance.100 
This principle of U.S. law would render unenforceable (at least in a U.S. 
court) many of Alexander Sack’s odious debts.101  Indeed, it would go further.  
Sack’s doctrine of odious debts could be applied only in cases of despotic regimes.  
We believe that U.S. public policy would not distinguish between bribing officials of 
a despotic or a democratic regime.  We would be surprised if public policy 
considerations in many other countries did not mandate a similar result. 
But what if the lender assigns its interest in the loan to a third-party who has 
no knowledge, or even a reason to suspect, that the original lender bribed the 
Ruritanian officials to enter into the loan?  Can the assignee enforce the loan 
agreement against the Republic of Ruritania?  If so, then considerations of public 
policy would have only a limited utility in blocking enforcement of corruptly-
induced loans. 
The general American rule regarding the assignment of contract rights 
provides that -- except in the case of negotiable instruments (which the Ruritanian 
loans are not) -- “[a]n assignee never gets a better right than the assignor had.  If for 
any reason the assignor’s claim was void, voidable, unenforceable, or conditional, so 
is the claim of the assignee.”102  Consequently, the assignee of an unenforceable loan 
will thus face the same defenses that the borrower could have raised against the 
original lender/assignor.103  An innocent assignee of such a loan, if denied the ability 
                                            
100  McConnell v. Commonwealth, 7 N.Y.2ds 465, 471 (1960).  See also Oscanyan v. 
Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880) (contracts to bribe or influence officials of 
foreign governments will not be enforced for public policy reasons; and the 
parties to the contract themselves cannot waive that illegality). 
101  See supra Part II.B.3.  
102  Arthur Corbin, Assignment of Contract Rights, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 205, 229 
(1926).  See also N.Y. Gen. Obligations L. § 13-105 (2005). 
103  An understandable desire to protect innocent assignees from financial loss can 
occasionally lead a court astray.  An example is Bankers Trust Co. v. Litton 
Business Telephone Systems, 559 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the court 
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to recover from Ruritania itself, may not be wholly without a remedy.  That assignee 
would presumably have a claim against the original lender/assignor for rescission, 
fraud, or breach of representation.104 
In addition, American law provides ample maneuvering room for a judge who 
wants to balance equities in a case involving illegal behavior by one or more of the 
parties to a transaction.  In the sovereign context, this flexibility could be used to 
validate a portion of a debt (for which the borrowing country received a benefit), 
while invalidating the remainder (for which no benefit accrued to the country as a 
whole).105  Under the headings of “restitution” and “unjust enrichment”,106 a court 
can fashion a remedy that penalizes a wrongdoer, apportions blame (and the 
consequences of blameworthy behavior) among multiple wrongdoers, shields the 
innocent, differentiates between venial and mortal sins against public policy, or does 
any of the foregoing in a manner that supports public policy while doing justice 
among the parties.107 
                                                                                                                           
(wrongly) classified a lessee’s obligation under an equipment lease as a 
negotiable instrument in order to give commercial bank assignees of the lease 
payments “holder in due course” status (thereby shielding them from the lessee’s 
bribery defense against the lessor). Id. at 490–91. 
104  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 333(1)(b) (suggesting that an 
assignment for value is deemed to convey a warranty by the assignor that the 
debt is subject to no defenses good against the assignor other than those stated or 
apparent at the time of the assignment).  See also, Lee C. Buchheit, Legal 
Aspects of Assignments of Interests in Commercial Bank Loans, in J. LEDERMAN, 
ET AL., THE COMMERCIAL LOAN RESALE MARKET 443, 449-50 (1991). 
105  An obvious example might involve a situation where the corrupt government 
officials in Ruritania misappropriated only a portion of the proceeds of the loan, 
the balance having gone into the Ruritanian state treasury.  A claim for restitution 
or unjust enrichment might lie for the recovery of the funds not stolen by the 
corrupt officials.  See generally, Christoph H. Schreuer, Unjustified Enrichment 
in International Law, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 281, 295-96 (1974). 
106  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1 (“Unjust Enrichment”) 
(1937). 
107  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Topic 5, Introductory Note, §§ 197-
199 (1979).  See also John Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through 
Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 302 (1947) (“[A]s long as the matter 
[relief by way of restitution] is within the general discretion of the courts, 
flexibility . . . is possible.  It would seem decidedly unfeasible to attempt to 
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2. Unclean Hands 
The public policy concerns about enforcing contracts that are tainted by 
bribery or other illegal activity can also be vindicated through the defense of 
“unclean hands” (the maxim of equity being that “he who comes to equity must come 
with clean hands.”).108  This doctrine can also limit the ability of a lender to enforce a 
debt contracted under irregular circumstances.  As explained by the Supreme Court: 
This maxim . . . is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a 
court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to 
the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the 
behavior of the defendant.109 
The maxim has been applied in a sovereign context to deny a recovery to 
plaintiffs that were participating in a criminal scheme with foreign governmental 
officials.  In Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,110 the plaintiff, James Adler, had 
been lured by Nigerian government officials and others into a bogus scheme through 
which he hoped to share in a $130 million bonanza from over-invoiced contracts with 
the Nigerian government.111  Neither the contracts nor the money ever existed; Adler 
was simply the dupe of what is, in Nigeria, a  quotidian confidence fraud.  But what 
an enthusiastic dupe he turned out to be.  Adler paid more than $5 million as bribes 
and commissions to Nigerian government officials and others in order to stay in the 
game.112  When the scales finally fell from his eyes, Adler sued the Republic of 
Nigeria, its Central Bank, a former Central Bank Governor and others in a federal 
court in California to recover the bribes and commissions.113 
                                                                                                                           
reduce the law in this field to a series of inflexible rules which would seek to 
cover every possible situation.”) 
108  See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 52 
(1948). 
109  Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery 
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945). 
110  219 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2000). 
111  Id. at 872-73. 
112  Id. at 873. 
113  Id.  The Nigerian Central Bank and certain of its officers were alleged to have 
participated actively in the fraud; their role as defendants in the case was not 
based exclusively on a “failure to supervise” theory. Id. at 871.  
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After an eight-day trial, the district court held that the doctrine of unclean 
hands (which, under California law, applies not only to claims in equity but also in 
law)114 barred Adler from recovering against the defendants.  On appeal, Adler 
argued that denying him a judicial remedy against the Nigerian fraudsters only served 
to enrich those Nigerian scoundrels.115  In effect, Adler was arguing that when the 
dramatis personae in the case include both domestic and foreign miscreants, patriotic 
American judges should visit any financial losses only on the foreigners. 
This argument met with a frosty reception at the Court of Appeals.  “[T]he 
fact that the defendants will receive a windfall,” the Ninth Circuit said, “is not an 
absolute bar to the unclean hands defense.”116  In addition,  
[P]ublic policy favors discouraging frauds such as the one perpetrated on 
Adler, but it also favors discouraging individuals such as Adler from 
voluntarily participating in such schemes and paying bribes to bring them 
to fruition.117 
Applying this doctrine to the Republic of Ruritania, a lender attempting to 
enforce in a U.S. court the Corrupt Loan (which involved, with the lender’s 
knowledge and acquiescence, corruption on the part of Ruritanian officials) could be 
met by a defense of unclean hands.  The defense might even be available in the case 
of the Suspicious Loan, depending on how deliberately obtuse the lender may have 
been in its investigation of the use of proceeds of the loan.118  An unclean hands 
                                            
114   Under New York law, however, the ability to raise an equitable unclean 
hands defense in an action at law may not be as clear, despite  New York’s 
abolition of all distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity.  See N.Y. 
Civil Practice Law and Rules § 103(a)(2006); Digiulio v. Robin, 2003 WL 
21018828 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 In Byron v. Clay, Judge Posner noted: “[W]ith the merger of law and equity, it is 
difficult to see why equitable defenses should be limited to equitable suits any 
more; and, of course many are not so limited, and perhaps unclean hands should 
be one of those.  Even before the merger there was a counterpart – in pari delicto 
– which forbade a plaintiff to recover damages if his fault was equal to the 
defendant’s.”  867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).   
115  219 F.3d 877. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118 See infra notes 129– 131, and accompanying text.  
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defense put forward by a successor Ruritanian government could relieve Ruritania 
from the obligation to repay the tainted loan. 
Unclean hands is an equitable defense.  In some states (but not in all), this 
equitable defense may be unavailable in an action at law for money damages.  If sued 
in such a state for money damages, the defendant may have to rely on legal defenses 
that cover much the same ground, such as fraud, illegality119or in pari delicito.120 
3. Agency Law 
Our three hypothetical loans may also be analyzed under principles of agency 
law.  For this purpose, we view Ruritania (meaning the country and its population 
over time) in the position of the “principal,” and the individual members of the 
government or ruling regime in Ruritania (representative or despotic) at any 
particular time as the “agents” of that principal insofar as they enter into contracts on 
behalf of the Republic of Ruritania with third parties such as lenders .121 
                                                                                                                           
 In Alaska Continental Bank v. Anchorage Commercial Land Assoc., 781 P.2d 
562 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1989), for example, a bank lent money to a limited 
partnership knowing that the consent of the limited partners (and not just the 
general partner who signed the loan) was required for such a borrowing under the 
partnership agreement.  When the partnership subsequently sought a declaration 
that it was not obligated to repay the loan, the bank argued that the partnership 
was equitably estopped from contesting the validity of a loan whose proceeds it 
had received. 
 The trial court declined to permit the bank to invoke an equitable estoppel 
defense, citing the bank’s own lack of clean hands in the affair.  The appellate 
court affirmed this determination, quoting this description by the lower court of 
the nature of the lending bank’s unclean hands: “At worst, [the bank] knowingly 
chose to overlook the irregularities in this case or to decline to investigate 
further.  At best, [the bank] was negligent in failing to seek information in the 
form of legal opinions and/or consultations with limited partners.”  Id. at 565, 
note 6. 
119 See Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies, vol. 1 at 152 (2d ed. 1973). 
120 Id., at 95, n. 6 and accompanying text. 
121  At least two other commentators in the modern odious debt literature look to 
principles of agency law to buttress their arguments.  In both cases, however, the 
discussions are brief and tangential to the central point being made, which is to 
argue for recognition of a doctrine of odious debts under principles of 
    
37  
 
Viewing the people of a country as the principal, and the government as the 
agent, is more than just a metaphor; it is how American political philosophy122 and 
American law123 have always viewed the governmental relationship.124  It doesn’t 
matter that despotic regimes would contest this characterization.  It is the very nature 
of despotic regimes that they regard themselves -- like Nero (by the grace of the 
Praetorian Guard) or Louis XIV (by the grace of Divine Right) -- as the rulers of the 
people, rather than their agent, much less their servant.125  But the fundamental 
premise of the American political experiment is that ultimate sovereignty and 
political authority rests with the people, and it is this premise that we believe would 
                                                                                                                           
international law.  See Hertz, supra note 63, at 179 (using the doctrine of actual 
authority from agency law to justify the first of the Sackian criteria; arguing that 
democratic consent should, as a matter of international law, be a precondition to 
recognizing the authority of a regime to contract on behalf of its citizens); 
Khalfan, et al., supra note 63, at 37-39 (pointing to common law principles of 
agency law, drawn from British and Canadian cases, that impose liability on third 
parties who willfully or knowingly assist in a breach of trust.) 
122  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, 243 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001) (“[G]overnments are in fact. . . agents and trustees of the 
people. . . . “). 
123  See Richard l. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency 
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989) (“The Constitution is 
premised on the belief that government should act as the agent of the people.”); 
see also Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties and Mediating Institutions, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1523–24 (1994) (finding a “noncontractual agency 
relationship” between voters and government officials); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1095–1102 (2004) 
(finding assertions of fiduciary duties owed by government officials to citizens in 
Aristotle and Cicero). 
124 The conceptualization of “the people” as the principal and the government  
(whether constituted by a monarch an external colonizer, or democratically 
elected representatives), as the agent, has a  history dating back at least to the 
13th century.  See Jedediah Purdy, Trust, Agency, Wardship: Private Law 
Concepts in the Development of Sovereignty (draft dated May 1, 2006, on file 
with authors) 
125 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 255 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968) (comparing 
the relationship between a despotic ruler and his citizens to that of a master over 
his servants). 
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guide an American court in applying the law of agency to the legal relationships 
created by our hypothetical Ruritanian loans.126 
The sovereign debt context raises a typical concern of agency law -- that of 
the faithless agent who purports to bind her principal to an obligation to a third party 
when the fruits received in return for the obligation accrue only to the agent.  Who, as 
between the principal (the country and its citizens) and the third party (the lender) 
should bear this risk of the faithless agent?  American agency law, using familiar 
concepts of “authority,” is clear that this risk is usually laid at the feet of the 
principal.  The reasons reflect both business expediency and some element of 
efficient risk bearing.127  Commerce would slow to a crawl if too severe a burden 
were put on creditors constantly to check back with a principal as to whether an agent 
                                            
126 A lack of consent can be argued to defeat an agency relationship, since the 
common law bases its agency rules on a consensual relationship manifested by 
both the principal and agent.  See Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 1(1). 
(“Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person [the principal] to another that the other [the agent] shall 
act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”)   
 The consent of the governed sometimes slips insensibly into usurpation by the 
governors.  Ferdinand Marcos was twice elected President of the Philippines 
until, legally banned from seeking reelection, he declared martial law and clung 
to power for another thirteen years.  See Stanley Karnow, In Our Image 356-57 
(1989).  If an agent, initially enjoying the consent of the principal, eventually 
overbears and controls the principal, has the agency relationship been destroyed?  
If so, this may not be apparent to the third parties who continue to deal with the 
agent as agent.  The better way to analyze this situation is to see the principal as 
being temporarily deprived of its ability to instruct and control agent. 
 
127  The commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Agency observes that while a 
person relying on the appearance of agency knows that the apparent agent is not 
authorized to act except for the benefit of the Principal, this is something that the 
third party normally cannot ascertain “and something therefore for which it is 
rational to require the Principal, rather than the other party to bear the risk. The 
underlying principle based on business expediency—the desire that third persons 
should be given reasonable protection in dealing with agents, finds expression in 
many rules…The line at which the Principal’s liability ceases is a matter of 
judicial judgment.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §262, Comment a. 
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had authority.  As between the principal and the third party, the principal who puts 
the agent in a position to cause the harm ought normally to bear the risk.128 
But there are circumstances -- out-of-the-ordinary and suspicious 
circumstances -- in which U.S. agency law places the risk of a runaway agent, and 
the burden of uncloaking such a runaway, on a third party such as a creditor.  For 
instance, where a corporate officer signs a guaranty for a debt for which the 
corporation is not receiving any benefit, “the duty of diligence in ascertaining 
whether an agent is exceeding his authority devolves on those who deal with him, not 
on his principal.”129  In a well-known case where the vice-president and treasurer of 
the Anaconda Corporation purported to act for Anaconda in guaranteeing the debt of 
another company, the court held that the third party, the recipient of the guaranty, 
could not rely on the asserted agency to bind Anaconda.130 What shifts to the third 
party the burden of verifying the agent’s fidelity to his principal in a particular 
transaction is the presence of visibly suspicious circumstances or behavior. 131 
Such a shift usually shows up in the context of “apparent authority” when 
elements of the “actual authority” of the agent cannot be shown.132  It is relatively 
easier in a sovereign debt context (as opposed to the normal corporate setting) for the 
agents to provide the instruments of authority that are typically taken to satisfy 
indicia of actual authority.    The same upturned hand that receives a bribe can, when 
inverted, sign the decree authorizing the incurrence by the state of the obligation 
procured by that bribe.  This is one of the reasons why the laws of many countries 
                                            
128 See id. 
129  Strip Clean Floor Refinishing v. New York District Council No. 9, 333 F. Supp. 
385, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
130  General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin International, Inc., 542 F. Supp 684, 690 
(S.D. N.Y. 1982) (“Because the circumstances surrounding the transaction were 
such as to put Haggiag on notice of the need to inquire further into Kraft’s power 
and good faith, Anaconda cannot be bound.”). 
131 Absent such suspicious circumstances or behavior, however, the law will not 
penalize innocent third parties if an agent--acting under color of  authority--is 
subsequently exposed as faithless. The decision in the General Overseas Films 
case makes this clear: “Had Kraft [Anaconda’s Vice President and Treasurer, 
with apparent authority to bid Anaconda] purported to borrow money for 
Anaconda [instead of guaranteeing the debts of an unrelated corporation], or in a 
credible manner for Anaconda’s benefit, he could have bound Anaconda even if 
he in fact intended and managed to steal the money.” Id. at 692 (emphasis 
added).  
132 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 49 (1958). 
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require the government to secure the approval of the legislature before undertaking 
any external borrowing.  In countries where the legislature is a representative 
assembly, these requirements operate to force the third party (the lender) to seek the 
ratification of the principal (the people, acting through their elected representatives) 
for the actions of the agent (the government).  Corruption by government officials is 
still possible, of course, but only where the legislature (acting on behalf of the 
principal—the people) fails to monitor the actions of the agent (the government) in 
carrying out the authorized borrowing.  In practical terms, such monitoring would 
involve accounting for the full proceeds of the loan, and ensuring that the terms of 
the borrowing are arm’s length and in line with prevailing market terms. 
By way of comparison,  American law does not usually regard directors as 
agents of the shareholders of a corporation,133  but American law is willing to curb 
the power of a corporate governing body when the body is acting wrongfully, usually 
defined as in breach of its fiduciary duty.  A well-known example is the breadth of a 
board’s ability under corporate law to terminate a shareholder derivative suit that has 
been instituted to challenge possible self-dealing conduct by directors.   American 
courts are clear that a board has the power not to pursue litigation, but courts will not 
respect the wrongful exercise of that power.  The Delaware Supreme Court put it this 
way “a board has the power to choose not to pursue litigation when demand is made 
upon it so long as the decision is not wrongful….the board remains empowered under 
§141(a) to make decision regarding corporate litigation.  The problem is one of 
member disqualification, not the absence of power in the board.”134 Similarly, an 
American court faced with a governing authority that had purported to act in a self-
dealing transaction will not accord respect to such wrongful action. 
In addition, the validity of the delegation of actual authority from the 
governing authority to the agent who acted for the regime is constrained by several 
principles of agency law. The existence of actual authority of the agent to perform 
certain functions does not automatically mean that the agent has the apparent 
authority to bind the principal in all matters, nor does it always remove from the third 
party the responsibility for ensuring that the agent has not strayed into the realm of 
self-dealing.  For example, the Restatement of Agency specifies that the authority to 
                                            
133 Restatement (Third) Agency §1.01, comment e (Tentative Draft #1 at 31 (2000) 
(“Directors’ powers originate as the legal consequence of their election and are 
not conferred or delegated by shareholders.”) 
134 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 4330 A.2d 779 (Del 1981)(“a board decision to 
cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as detrimental to the company after 
demand has been made and refused will be respected unless it is wrongful.”) 
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act as an agent includes only the authority to act for the benefit of the principal,135 
and that agents owe a fiduciary duty to their principals.136  Where a third party is 
aware that the agent is acting for his own purpose, the principal is not liable to the 
third party.137  Indeed, agency law goes beyond merely voiding the contract between 
the principal and the third party in such situations, it declares that a third party who 
suborns a betrayal of trust by the agent is answerable in tort to the principal.138 If the 
circumstances of the transaction raise reasonable doubts about whether the agent is 
faithfully representing the interests of his principal, these principles suggest that the 
third party is under a duty to investigate.139 
                                            
135  See id. at § 39, cmt. a (1958) (“In business enterprises, an agent normally has no 
authority to seek personal advantage otherwise than through faithful performance 
of his duties.”). 
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §13 (1958). 
137  Id. § 165.  An 1893 decision of the New York Court of Appeals expressed the 
rule in these terms: 
It is an old doctrine, from which there has never been any 
departure, that an agent cannot bind his principal, even in matters 
touching his agency, where he is known to be acting for himself, 
or to have an adverse interest…. 
The plaintiff in such a case assumes the risk of the agent’s 
disloyalty to his trust, and has no occasion for surprise when he 
discovers that the agent has served himself more faithfully than his 
principal. 
 The Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. The Forty-Second St. and Grand St. Ferry 
Railroad Co., 139 N.Y. 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1893) (citations omitted). 
 More recently, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the vitality of this “Faithless 
Servant Defense” but held, in that case, that the party asserting the defense 
offered no factual allegations in support of its claim that the agent was engaged 
in self-dealing.  Citibank. N.A. v. Nyland (CF8) Ltd., 878 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
138  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312, comment d (1958). 
139  The Restatement (Second) of Agency states: “Whether or not the Third Party has 
reason to know of A’s improper motives is a question of fact.  If he knows that 
the agent is acting for the benefit of himself or a third person, the transaction is 
suspicious on its face and the Principal is not bound unless the Agent is 
authorized.”  Id. at §165 comment c.  Comment a to this provision says the 
agent’s actions come under inherent agency authority.  The Restatement (Third) 
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The Restatement (Third) of Agency’s admonition should apply here: “A 
principal should not be held to assume the risk that an agent may act wrongfully in 
dealing with a third party who colludes with the agent in action that is adverse to the 
principal.”140  That quote derives from a section specifying a rule against a third party 
being able to impute a faithless agent’s knowledge to a principal, a discussion the 
Restatement puts squarely within a risk assumption framework .141 That is, the third 
party should not benefit from imputing the agent’s knowledge to the principal when 
the third party itself acted wrongfully or otherwise in bad faith.  The circumstances 
surrounding a transaction, including the magnitude of benefit it will confer on the 
agent who arranges it, may place a reasonable third party on notice that the agent will 
withhold material information from the principal.  142 
The Restatement prescribes similar rules for other contexts.   The “adverse 
domination” doctrine  tolls the statute of limitations that otherwise would block, on 
timeliness grounds, a principal’s suit.143  The typical Adverse Domination  case today 
involves a corporation that for some period was controlled (adversely dominated) by 
                                                                                                                           
of Agency, now in the final drafting stages, makes a similar point within the 
context of apparent authority (having abandoned inherent agency power as a 
distinctive label and incorporated it within the concept of manifestation under 
authority generally.)  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03, Comment d 
at 160 (Tentative Draft #2 2001) (“In a transactional context, the agent’s position 
as a fiduciary should prompt doubt in the mind of the reasonable third party 
when the agent appears to be using authority to bind the principal to a transaction 
that will not benefit the principal.”). 
140 See Restatement,(Third) Agency Tentative Draft No. 4 (2003), at 215 
141 See Restatement,(Third) Agency Tentative Draft No. 4 (2003), at 294 (“It is 
helpful to view questions about imputation from the perspective of risk 
assumption taking into account the posture of the third party whose legal 
relations with the principal are at issue.”) 
142 See Tentative Draft No. 4 (March 17, 2003), at 215.  See also Invest Almaz v. 
Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 242 F. 3d 57, 74 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that 
“[i]n the majority of jurisdictions the law has evolved towards a recognition that 
information given to even a fraudulent agent should normally be imputed to the 
principal, unless the third party providing the information has notice that the 
agent is acting adversely or otherwise colludes with the faithless agent”); cf. 
Lysee v. Marine Bank, 2005 WL 1630854 (Wis. App. 2005) (where the 
principal, a widow, slips into dementia during course of an agency relationship, 
was unable to control the actions of her agent, self serving actions of the agent in 
assigning certificates of deposit are held void). 
143Restatement (Third) Agency (Ten. Draft #4 2003 at 215).  
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a self-dealing set of directors or managers.   When the self-dealing crowd exits the 
scene, a new set of directors may sue their predecessors for their misbehavior while 
in control of the company.  But what if the malefactors argue that their alleged 
misdeeds took place years ago and that the statute of limitations on those misdeeds 
has elapsed.  The doctrine of Adverse Domination solves that problem by tolling the 
statute of limitations clock for the period during which the self-dealing managers 
were in control; a period during which the corporation could not sue because the bad 
guys prevented it from doing so.   
Application of agency law principles to an odious debt context should also 
include one further traditional agency issue, that of ratification. The general worry 
encompassed by ratification is that the principal will sit back and behave 
opportunistically as against the third party by , for example, accepting the benefit that 
the third party provided and, when time comes to pay back the loan,  arguing that the 
agent lacked the authority to speak for the principal.  The Restatement (Third) 
describes the general rule this way:  “A person may ratify an act…by receiving or 
retaining benefits it generated if the person has knowledge of material facts and no 
independent claim to the benefit.”144  A debt becomes odious in the eyes of the 
citizens of a country, however, in part because the proceeds of a borrowing do not 
benefit those people; the benefits flow to the governing regime that incurred the debt.  
Thus, the principal here (the people) are never given a chance to behave 
opportunistically vis-à-vis the third party lender.  To use the terminology of the 
Restatement, there were never any “benefits” for the principal to retain. 
Applying these principles to our three hypothetical Ruritanian loans yields 
these conclusions.  The Corrupt Loan is voidable at the option of a successor 
government in Ruritania.  The reason?  The lender knew that the prior ruling regime 
(or officials in that regime) had breached its fiduciary duty to its principal -- the 
country and the people of Ruritania -- by committing Ruritania to repay money that 
was misappropriated by the government officials for their own purposes.  Indeed, a 
successor regime in Ruritania may even have a claim against the lender for the 
damages (the money previously paid to service the loan while the old regime was in 
power) resulting from the lender’s bribery of the corrupt government officials 
involved. 
Agency law would also say that the Suspicious Loan imposes an affirmative 
duty on the lender to investigate whether the governmental officials contracting the 
loan were indeed acting in the interests of Ruritania, as opposed to their own 
interests.  It is here that the reputation of a corrupt governmental regime becomes 
relevant to the analysis.  A loan will not be unenforceable merely because it was 
                                            
144 Restatement (Third) Agency §4.01(g) Tentative Draft #4 2003 at page 370. 
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contracted by a corrupt regime.  But that regime’s reputation for corruption may 
place upon the lender, as a matter of agency law, a higher burden to satisfy itself that 
the proceeds of the borrowing are benefiting the principal (the country) and not just 
the agent (the government officers signing the loan agreement). 
It is conceivable (just) in a private actor setting that a principal might 
countenance a degree of self-interested behavior on the part of an agent (much like the 
old Roman custom of appointing provincial “tax farmers” who would remit a specified 
amount of tax revenue back to Rome, but who were then free to retain for themselves 
any excess contributions they could exact from the unhappy taxpayers).  But it is 
fanciful to believe that the principal involved in this case (the millions of dispersed 
Ruritanian citizens) would ever have condoned the theft by government officials of 
money borrowed in their name and repayable out of their (or their posterity’s) taxes. 
The Utterly Fatuous Loan, however, untainted by the fact or even the 
suspicion of corruption, binds the principal -- the country and citizens of Ruritania.  
In American law, the cupidity of government officials in borrowing money may give 
rise to a defense to repayment of the debt; the stupidity of government officials does 
not. 
4. Piercing the Governmental Veil 
We have been speaking in this article about the circumstances in which 
principles of private (domestic) law in the United States might permit a successor 
government legally to disavow a debt obligation incurred by its predecessor.  The 
common theme running through these possible defenses is that when a third party 
suborns a government to betray its duty to the country on whose behalf it purports to 
act, or when a third party consciously turns a Nelsonian blind eye to such a betrayal, 
the resulting contract between that third party and the traduced sovereign state is 
voidable at the option of a successor government. 
There is, we believe, an additional way to analyze these legal relationships 
that draws upon the American law approach to the legal fiction known as the 
corporation.  On several levels, the legal analysis of a sovereign state parallels that of 
a corporation.  Both are artificial persons recognized by law as separate persons from 
their constituent members (a state has citizens,145 a corporation has shareholders146).  
                                            
145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 201, cmt. c (1987). 
146 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND 
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, 124–27 (9th ed. 2004). 
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A state is managed by a government, a corporation is managed by officers and 
directors.  Both may have creditors or other contractual counterparties. 
This recognition of entity separateness creates benefits in terms of 
streamlining collective action and permitting the entity an enduring life beyond the 
death of any one participant. The corporation achieves this status as a creature of 
positive law in the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated.  A sovereign state, 
however, achieves this status only by being recognized as such by other sovereign 
states, much like a stray wolf who follows a new pack at a distance for some period 
of time until -- after being appropriately sniffed, pawed and bitten by the incumbents 
-- is admitted to full membership in the pack.147 
The law normally disregards the ever-changing cast of these individual 
stakeholders and treats the rights and obligations of the entity as belonging to the 
continuing legal fiction -- the state or the corporation.  But there are limits beyond 
which American law will not respect the legal fiction if to do so would injure 
innocent parties. 
One prominent exception in corporate law is the doctrine known as “piercing 
the corporate veil” (“PCV”).148  Indeed, it is the most litigated issue in corporate 
law.149 In the garden-variety PCV case, creditors of the corporation will seek a 
court’s permission to look through (to pierce) the limited liability veil of the 
corporation, with the goal of recovering their claims from a controlling shareholder 
that abused the corporate form by treating the corporation as its alter ego.  In the 
typical fact pattern, a separate corporate entity with no assets has been inserted by a 
richer shareholder between it and a third party creditor, with the consequence that the 
creditor has no realistic source of recovery for future payment obligations of the 
company.  A court, if it finds that the shareholder and the corporation have abused 
                                            
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 201, comment (h) (1987) (observing that “Whether an entity satisfies the 
requirements for statehood is ordinarily determined by other states when they 
decide whether to treat that entity as a state.”). See id. at § 203(1) (“A state is not 
required to accord formal recognition to the government of another state, but is 
required to treat as the government of another state a regime that is in effective 
control of that state, except as set forth [in this section under the rules governing 
the use of force under the United Nations charter].”). 
148  For discussions of the subject, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL (1991 ed. & Supp. 2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing 
Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001). 
149  Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991). 
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the normal limited liability characteristic of a corporation to harm the third party 
creditor, will disregard the separate entity and pierce the veil so that the creditor can 
recover directly from the controlling shareholder.150  In other examples of 
disregarding the entity, courts will pierce the veil to block the shareholder from using 
the separate entity to avoid a government regulation or for other nefarious 
purposes.151 
The PCV doctrine in American law has thus evolved in a flexible manner to 
address the many different ways in which legal fictions such as corporations can be 
abused by insiders.  The law has an interest in seeing that any entity carrying the 
suffix “Inc.” or one of its substitutes will be operated in a manner consistent with the 
legal requirements and expectations that the legislature had in mind when it 
authorized these legal fictions.  “Abuse of the corporation” therefore is a shorthand 
way of saying that one or more of the stakeholders in the enterprise has acted outside 
of the range of the rights and duties anticipated by the legislature when it authorized 
the creation of limited liability entities.152  In effect, the wrongdoer will have taken 
advantage of the unspoken expectations of the other stakeholders (that they are all 
playing by these rules) as the camouflage to conceal the misbehavior.  This is 
probably a workable definition for the concept of cheating in any rules-based game, 
with the possible exception of solitaire. 
Sovereign debt involves a similar risk of possible misuse of separate entity 
status.  The same trio of actors is involved -- the principal (the country or the entity), 
the agent (the managers of the corporation or the government of the country) and the 
third party who extends credit to the entity or country.  Abuse results when two of the 
three try to use the separate character of the legal fiction (the corporation or the state) 
to victimize the third.  In a typical pattern of corporate misuse, the manager/agent and 
shareholders are aligned in creating a “no asset” corporation that will shift the risk of 
non-payment to the third-party creditor.  In the sovereign debt setting, however, the 
danger is that the third party creditor and the faithless agent (the corrupt government) 
                                            
150 See, e.g., Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chemical and Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569–70 
(7th Cir. 1985) (observing that the veil may be pierced where maintenance of the 
legal fiction would “sanction a fraud or promote injustice”). 
151  STEPHEN B. PRESSER, supra note 148, at § 1:5 (1991 ed. & Supp. 2004).  See also 
§ 1:13 (discussing the need to disregard the corporate form when it is used “to 
defraud creditors, to evade existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve 
or perpetuate a monopoly, or to protect knavery and crime.”). 
152 See, e.g., Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 
1991) (applying the Van Dorn analysis in observing that the defendant was using 
the corporate form as his “plaything”). 
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will collude to take advantage of an innocent principal (the citizens or future 
citizens).  By lifting the veil of separate entity status, a court may fashion a remedy 
that allows the creditor to recover from the abusing shareholder (in the corporate 
context), or the state to avoid the debts contracted by the collusive lender and corrupt 
government officials (in the sovereign context). 
B. Possible Problems 
1. The Problem of Proof 
Challenging the enforceability of the Suspicious Loan extended to a 
predecessor regime in a court of law places upon the sovereign defendant a burden of 
proving the “irregular” (to use Chief Justice Taft’s adjective in the Tinoco 
Arbitration) circumstances surrounding the incurrence of the loan.153  This may not 
be an easy task.  By their very nature, fraud and corruption can be notoriously 
difficult to prove.  Cross-border corruption is even more difficult to substantiate, and 
cross-border corruption that occurred years or decades earlier exceptionally difficult.  
In the 27 years (through 2004) that followed the passage of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”), for example, the U.S. Department of Justice brought only 39 
criminal prosecutions and seven civil enforcement actions under the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA.154  One imagines that in nearly three decades, there were 
many other transgressions that went undetected, unproven and unpunished. 
We believe that governmental corruption in some countries at certain times is 
so suffocatingly ubiquitous that a U.S. court could legitimately shift onto the plaintiff 
the burden of showing that a particular a transaction was not tainted by corruption.  A 
reputation for corrupt behavior is no longer, as it once was, just a matter the 
accumulated sediment of hundreds or thousands of personal anecdotes recounted by 
those on the receiving end of what Mexicans charmingly call “the bite”.  Several 
independent groups have devised methods by which the extent of governmental 
corruption in a particular country can be assessed and even ranked in a comparative 
matrix with other countries.155  Against a showing of pervasive corruption, is it 
                                            
153 Tinoco Arbitration, reprinted at supra note 41, at 168.  
154  U.S. Dept. of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Addressing the 
Challenges of International Bribery and Fair Competition 2004 (July 2004) 
(available at http://www.tcc.mac.doc.gov/pdf/2004bribery.pdf). 
155   See e.g., Press Release, Transparency International, Transparency International 
Corruptions Perceptions 2004 (Oct. 20, 2004) (available at 
http://ww1.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html); 
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unreasonable to ask the plaintiff/lender to explain how it alone had managed to 
preserve its virtue in dealing with the corrupt regime? 
In a variety of contexts, U.S. courts are called upon to acknowledge the 
existence of widespread corruption in foreign countries and to draw reasonable 
inferences about the conduct of persons who do business with governmental agencies in 
those countries.  The original version of the FCPA passed in 1977, for example, 
criminalized payments to foreign government officials, or to an intermediary for such 
an official, where the payor knew or “had reason to know” that the purpose of the 
payment was to influence a foreign governmental action or to obtain business.156  The 
phrase “had reason to know” was widely criticized by American businesspeople.157  In 
many cross-border transactions, exporters find it useful to retain the services of a local 
agent or intermediary.  How can the exporter be sure that some of the compensation 
paid to a local agent will not find its way into the hands of government officials? 
In response to complaints that the phrase “reason to know” was so imprecise 
that it inhibited legitimate competition by American exporters, Congress amended the 
FCPA in 1988 to delete this phrase.158  The 1988 amendments limited the bribery 
prohibition of the FCPA to payments made with “knowledge” that all or part of the 
money would be used for bribery.159  Drawing from the Model Penal Code, however, 
the 1988 amendments defined a person’s knowledge with respect to conduct or 
circumstance or a result (in this context, a bribe) as that person’s being aware of a “high 
probability” of the occurrence of the conduct or circumstance, or being “substantially 
certain” of the result.160  The Conference Report for the 1988 amendments said that the 
conferees intended that the requisite state of mind for this offense include a “conscious 
purpose to avoid learning the truth,”161 and used phrases such as “willful blindness”, 
                                                                                                                           
Press Release, Transparency International, Transparency International Releases 
New Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2002 (May 14, 2002) (available at 
http://ww1.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html). 
156  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1977). 
157  See, e.g., Peter  D. Trooboff, Current Development: Proposed Amendment of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 77 A.J.I.L. 340, 341 (April 1983). 
158  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107, 1419 (1988). 
159  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100–576, at 920 (1988). 
160  15 U.S.C. § 78 dd-2(h)(3) (1988). 
161  H.R. Conf. Rep., supra note 159, at 919. 
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“deliberate ignorance,” “conscious disregard” and “a head in the sand”, 162 to explain 
when a party can be held to “know” that illicit conduct is afoot.163 
American judges will take judicial notice of foreign governmental corruption 
in other contexts as well.  One of the grounds for nonrecognition in the United States 
of a foreign court judgment, for example, is the absence of impartial tribunals or fair 
procedures in the country in which the judgment was handed down.  This 
determination must be made by the U.S. court that is asked to recognize the foreign 
judgment.  “The recognizing court may make this determination without formal proof 
or argument, on the basis of general knowledge and judicial notice”.164 
In Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank,165 a Liberian corporation (Bridgeway) 
sought to enforce in a U.S. federal court a money judgment it had obtained against 
Citibank in Liberia.166  The U.S. federal district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Citibank on the ground that Liberia’s courts did not constitute “a system of 
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice”.167  On appeal, 
the parties quarreled over who bore the ultimate burden of proof with respect to the 
fairness of the Liberian judicial system.168  The appeals court declined to express an 
opinion on this issue, but held that even if the burden of proof rested with Citibank, 
that burden had been carried by the production of affidavit evidence and an 
unflattering U.S. State Department report about the Liberian judiciary.169  Although 
the Second Circuit’s opinion does not say so explicitly, Citibank’s evidence about the 
generally bleak state of the Liberian judicial system shifted the burden onto 
Bridgeway to contradict Citibank’s characterization.  Bridgeway failed to do so.  The 
                                            
162  Id. See also John E. Impert, A Program for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INT’L 
LAWYER 1009, 1014 (1990). 
163 Id.  
164  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 482 cmt b (1987). 
165  201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1999). 
166 Id. at 137. 
167  Id. at 139. 
168 Id. at 141–42. 
169 Id.  
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dismissal of Bridgeway’s action for recognition of the Liberian judgment was 
therefore affirmed.170 
In motions for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, U.S. judges are 
occasionally asked to take judicial notice of the fact that the courts of a proposed 
alternative forum are so corrupt, or so inefficient, that they do not meet even a 
minimally-acceptable standard for an adequate alternative forum for the action.  In 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin,171 a federal district court denied a motion by Bolivian 
defendants to dismiss the case on forum non grounds.172  The plaintiffs developed an 
extensive record showing that the Bolivian judicial system was corrupt at all levels.  
The court reached this conclusion despite its recognition that “the ‘alternative forum 
is too corrupt to be adequate’ argument does not enjoy a particularly impressive track 
record.173 
More directly on point in the area of foreign governmental corruption is 
Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier.174  In that case, the Republic of Haiti brought an action 
in a New York state court against the wife of the deposed Haitian dictator (“Baby 
Doc” Duvalier) for embezzlement and conversion of public assets.175  The trial court 
granted Mrs. Duvalier’s motion for summary judgment and an appeal followed.176 
The Appellate Division noted the evidence produced by the Haitian 
Government at trial concerning the widespread corruption of the Duvalier regime, 
including circumstantial evidence suggesting that the Duvaliers had pilfered 
substantial amounts of public funds.  “This combination of direct and circumstantial 
evidence,” the appeals court ruled, “is sufficient to establish [Haiti’s] conversion 
claim, prima facie.”177  The Court held that the burden had thus shifted to Mrs. 
Duvalier to produce evidence that would establish a triable issue of fact on the 
corruption allegation”.178  She failed to do so and the trial court’s summary judgment 
in her favor was reversed. 
                                            
170 Id. at 144. 
171  978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
172 Id. at 1082. 
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There is, in short, no reason to believe that Ruritania would have to produce 
“smoking gun” evidence of a lender’s collusion with corrupt officials of the prior 
regime in order for Ruritania to prevail in one or more of the defenses discussed in this 
Part.  Nor could a lender escape a compelling, if circumstantial, inference of corruption 
merely by turning a Nelsonian blind eye to those circumstances.179  There is indeed a 
price to be paid for dealing with a notoriously corrupt regime and that price, at the very 
least, is a higher standard of vigilance and investigation. 
2. In Pari Delicto 
The above discussion has assumed a litigation scenario in which a successor 
government of Ruritania appears in a lawsuit in a U.S. court to contest the 
enforcement of a loan extended to the prior ruling regime in Ruritania.  Our 
hypotheticals have assumed that the loan was incurred in the name of the Republic of 
Ruritania.  The government that borrowed the money did so as agent for the Republic 
and the government that now appears to defend the lawsuit also does so as agent for 
the Republic. 
In the Ruritanian Corrupt Loan example, the corrupt government that stole 
the proceeds of the loan would have been awkwardly placed to construct a legal 
defense based on its own misconduct or the misconduct of the lender that bribed it.  
Like the Adler case discussed in Part IV.A.2 above,180 all the parties appearing before 
the trial court under these circumstances would share a degree of culpability.  But 
following a regime change in Ruritania, the new (blameless) government may well 
try to mount defenses to enforcement of the loan along the lines of those suggested in 
Part IV.A above.  This may in turn prompt the lender to argue that the defendant 
Republic of Ruritania -- ignoring the interim change of government -- was at the very 
least in pari delicto (of equal fault) with the lender in the whole affair.  The equitable 
doctrine of in pari delicto precludes one wrongdoer from asserting claims against a 
                                            
179  In an appeal of a criminal conviction brought under the mail fraud statute, for 
example, the First Circuit approved jury instructions that the required element of 
knowledge of the fraud could be proved by circumstances showing the 
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180 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
    
52  
 
confederate who is equally at fault.  This is precisely the argument on which Adler 
relied in his (unsuccessful) attempt to disarm Nigeria’s unclean hands defense.181 
The question then is whether the new Ruritanian government, when it 
inherited the debt of its predecessor, also inherited the disability of that predecessor 
to resist legal enforcement of the debt based on the predecessor’s own misconduct in 
the affair. 
There are parallels in the corporate field.  A trustee or a receiver in the 
bankruptcy of a corporation similarly “steps into the shoes” of the bankrupt 
enterprise.182  In a derivative suit, shareholders assert the rights of the corporation to 
redress injuries to the corporation.183  In each of these situations, a similar question 
can arise:  will the successor (the trustee, the receiver or the shareholder in a 
derivative action) be entitled to assert the claims of the enterprise against third parties 
and, if so, will that successor be subject to any equitable defenses (such as unclean 
hands or in pari delicto) that those third parties may have had against the enterprise 
itself? 
In the case of a trustee in bankruptcy, U.S. courts have generally interpreted 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code to limit a trustee’s rights to those of the 
corporation as they that existed at the time of the commencement of the bankruptcy 
proceeding.184  Accordingly, if the bankrupt corporation had participated in the 
wrongdoing, it would on the date of commencement of the bankruptcy have been 
disabled from pursuing claims against confederate wrongdoers on in pari delicto 
grounds.  The trustee, stepping into those shoes, suffers that same disability.185 
Court-appointed receivers, however, are a different matter.  Receivers are not 
limited by Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code and, in pursuing claims of the 
                                            
181 See Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2000). 
182 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 146, at 258–59. 
183 Id. at 205. 
184 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). 
185  See, e.g., Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 
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corporation against other wrongdoers, receivers are generally not hampered by the in 
pari delicto defenses raised by those third parties.186  In Scholes v. Lehmann,187 for 
example, a 1995 Seventh Circuit decision, the court confronted those facts:  Michael 
Douglas had set up several corporations and caused those corporations in turn to 
create limited partnerships for the ostensible purpose of investing in commodity 
trades.188  Prospective investors in the limited partnerships were lured by promises of 
a return of 10 to 20 percent a month on their original investments.189 
The entire arrangement was a Ponzi scheme.  Douglas himself stole most of 
the money.  The balance was strategically paid out to early investors to establish the 
track record that Ponzi operators need to prime the pump for future victims.  Within 
two years, the scheme collapsed.  Douglas went (more precisely, went back) to 
jail.190 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission brought a civil suit against 
Douglas’s corporations and asked a federal court for the appointment of a receiver 
for both Douglas and those corporations.191  That receiver, Steven Scholes, set about 
recovering as fraudulent conveyances money that Douglas had siphoned from the 
corporations and transferred to his wife (ex-wife by the time of the lawsuit), one of 
the investors and several charitable organizations. These transferees argued that 
Douglas and his three corporations were integral components of the Ponzi scheme.192  
How then, the transferees asked, could a receiver stepping into the shoes of Douglas 
and his three corporations pursue fraudulent conveyance claims against third parties 
in the face of the in pari delicto doctrine? 
In a masterful opinion by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit articulated a 
displacement theory.  The rationale behind the in pari delicto doctrine is that 
wrongdoers should not be allowed to benefit from their own wrongdoing.  That 
rationale, the court concluded, is inapplicable to a receiver.  Once Douglas had been 
displaced by the court-appointed receiver, Douglas no longer stood to benefit from 
the recovery of the fraudulently-conveyed funds.  Thus, the in pari delicto doctrine 
did not bar a recovery by a successor administrator (the receiver) once the wrongdoer 
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(Douglas) had been ousted from control of, and beneficial interest in, the 
corporations.193  In language that a successor government of Ruritania might easily 
adapt to its own situation in the corrupt Ruritanian loan cases, the Seventh Circuit 
held that after the appointment of the receiver: 
The corporations were no more Douglas’s evil zombies.  Freed from his 
spell they became entitled to the return of the moneys -- for the benefit 
not of Douglas but of innocent investors -- that Douglas had made the 
corporations divert to unauthorized purposes….  Put differently, the 
defense of in pari delicto loses its sting when the person who is in pari 
delicito is eliminated.194 
This leaves the interesting question of whether the analogy between a 
receiver and a successor Ruritanian government is sound.195  In a situation where the 
prior regime was ousted from dictatorial control over the country, the successor 
government truly is, to use the words of one U.S. court in describing court-appointed 
receivers, “thrust into the shoes” of its predecessor.196  By definition, that new 
government was not complicit in the misdeeds of the prior regime. Disabling the 
successor government from pursuing third parties that assisted the previous regime in 
perpetrating those misdeeds or, in the Ruritanian corrupt loan cases, depriving the 
successor regime of a legal defense to the enforcement of a corrupt loan, would only 
convey a benefit to the wrongdoers at the expense of the citizens and innocent 
creditors of Ruritania.  The rationale of the Scholes case should logically apply by 
analogy to this situation:  once the corporation (acting through its receiver) or the 
sovereign state (acting through its new government) liberates itself from the control 
of the wrongdoer, the in pari delicto doctrine should not disable the innocent 
                                            
193 Id. at 754–55. 
194  See also FDIC v. American Diversified Savings Bank, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995) 
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successor from pursuing claims or asserting defenses against those who knowingly 
participated in the misbehavior of the recently-departed regime.197 
V. Conclusion 
It would never have occurred to Alexander Sack to suggest that successor 
governmental regimes should rely exclusively on municipal courts of law to 
invalidate the infamous debts incurred by their predecessors.  There was a good 
reason for this.  At the time Sack was writing (the 1920s), most countries recognized 
an “absolute” theory of sovereign immunity; sovereigns could not be sued in foreign 
courts without their consent.198  Commercial creditors were therefore compelled to 
seek the diplomatic assistance of their own governments in protesting debt defaults 
by foreign sovereign borrowers.199  If commercial loans could not become the subject 
of lawsuits in municipal courts, there was obviously no reason to spend much time 
speculating about what defenses the sovereign defendants might have run in such 
cases. 
All of that changed dramatically about the middle of the last century.  The 
prevailing notion of absolute sovereign immunity gave way to a “restrictive” theory 
under which sovereigns could be held accountable in municipal courts for their 
commercial activities abroad.200  This restrictive theory was eventually codified into 
law in the late-1970s in both the United States and the United Kingdom.201 
For Alexander Sack and for all other interested commentators in the 50 years 
following him, therefore, the only possible countermeasure to the mandatory 
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inheritance of debts incurred by a despotic regime lay in achieving an international 
consensus that such obligations should not, as a matter of international law, continue 
to burden the citizens of the country once the despot had been removed. But lenders 
now have legal remedies in municipal courts to pursue their debt recovery efforts.  
For the last 30 years in the United States, the legal enforcement of foreign sovereign 
debt obligations has been the province of U.S. federal judges applying conventional 
doctrines of state contract law.  In those lawsuits, the sovereign defendants are 
perfectly at liberty to assert defenses based on principles of that same contract law or 
on U.S. public policy generally. 
In short, the dream of Alexander Sack and many others since -- to achieve an 
international consensus about what constitutes an odious sovereign debt -- has been 
overtaken by events.  This is probably just as well.  As a putative “doctrine” of public 
international law, it faced an El Capitan of definitional obstacles.  Had it flown at all 
(which we doubt), it probably would have flown very low, far beneath the level of 
near-universal consensus required to make it a binding norm of international law. 
The prospect of yoking innocent generations of citizens to the repayment of 
any Profligate Debt causes an audible grinding of the moral teeth; the prospect of 
forcing this result on people who have already been victimized by a corrupt and 
despotic regime is even more distasteful.  The attempt over all these years to enshrine 
a public international law doctrine of odious debts has been fueled by this sense of 
moral outrage.  Strong moral imperatives, however, have a way of embodying 
themselves in principles of domestic law as well as public international law.  We 
have suggested that the entrenched hostility of American law to bribery, litigants 
with unclean hands, faithless agents and public officials embezzling state funds under 
the cover of what we have called the “governmental veil”, is adequate to allow a 
sovereign defendant to defend itself in an American court against the attempted 
enforcement of what Alexander Sack would have recognized as an odious debt. 
Establishing legal defenses on a loan-by-loan basis will achieve some, but 
certainly not all, of the objectives that modern champions of a doctrine of odious debt 
are seeking to promote.  This approach will certainly have an in terrorem effect on 
prospective lenders that are toying with the idea of lending to disreputable regimes.  
It will not, however, provide a legal pretext for wholesale debt cancellation for 
emerging market countries previously ruled by kleptomaniacal regimes, nor will it 
permit a legal repudiation of Profligate Debts that were incurred for hare-brained 
projects. 
A country weighed down by a history of imprudent borrowings is not, 
however, wholly without recourse.  It is not necessary to repudiate (in a legal sense) 
every loan whose payments the country can no longer afford.  Even in the absence of 
a transnational bankruptcy code applicable to sovereign debtors, overindebted 
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countries have been able to approach their creditors (bilateral and commercial) for 
consensual debt relief when the accumulated debt burden becomes unsustainable, or 
is sustainable only at the cost of diverting all public financial resources away from 
other necessary expenditures.  The sovereign debt restructuring process as it has 
evolved over the last 25 years is often not pleasant -- indeed, it is frequently 
exasperating, contentious and attenuated -- but it is a recognized feature of the 
international financial system. 
 
 
